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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE 
RATIONING OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
AZIZ Z. HUQ† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article analyzes the doctrinal instruments federal courts use 
to allocate scarce adjudicative resources over competing demands for 
constitutional remedies. It advances two claims. First, a central, 
hitherto underappreciated, doctrinal instrument for rationing judicial 
resources is a demand that most constitutional claimants demonstrate 
that an official violated an exceptionally clear, unambiguous 
constitutional rule—that is, not only that the Constitution was 
violated, but that the violation evinced a demanding species of fault. 
This fault rule first emerged in constitutional tort jurisprudence. It has 
diffused to the suppression and postconviction review contexts. The 
Article’s second claim is that fault-based rationing of constitutional 
remedies flows, to an underappreciated degree, from an institutional 
commitment to judicial independence. Federal courts have developed 
branch-level autonomy, along with distinctly institutional interests, 
over the twentieth century. These interests are inconsistent with the 
vindication of many individualized constitutional claims. Although 
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ideological preferences and changing socioeconomic conditions have 
had well-recognized influences on the path of constitutional remedies, 
I argue that the judiciary’s institutional preferences have also played a 
large role. This causal link between judicial independence and 
remedial rationing raises questions about federal courts’ function in 
the Separation of Powers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III adjudication is a scarce good.1 This is not just a 
function of rising caseloads, statutory as well as constitutional, 
outstripping federal courts’ capacity.2 It also flows inexorably from 
the fact that settled constitutional rules are daily broken. Between the 
1950s and the 1970s, the Supreme Court fashioned a thick network of 
constitutional rules to bind police officers, prison officials, 
prosecutors, state trial court judges, and frontline bureaucrats.3 These 
rules are often observed now only in the breach. Even in the well-
structured, closely supervised context of state criminal courts, there is 
ample evidence that constitutional rights are systemically flouted.4 
Some municipal justice systems may stay solvent by illegally depriving 
citizens of basic liberties.5 On our nation’s streets, constitutional 
violations are routinized in some urban neighborhoods.6 We simply 
 
 1. Judicial recognition of this point is frequent. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2080 (2011) (“Courts should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to 
resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have 
no effect on the outcome of the case.”); see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce 
Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 402 & nn.1–5 (2013) (collecting statements by 
judges and numerical evidence of increasing caseload pressures). 
 2. Between 1990 and 2012, federal district courts’ combined civil and criminal caseloads 
rose by 31 percent, whereas the number of judges rose by 17.7 percent, Judicial Facts and 
Figures 2012 Table 6.1: Total Civil and Criminal Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending 
(Including Transfers), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13382/download [http://perma
.cc/523X-D26T].  
 3. For a celebratory account, see generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN 
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998). 
 4. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE, at iv–v (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JVP-PAZ4] (finding that many indigents still lack adequate 
representation and that legal aid programs are woefully underfunded); see also Eve Brensike 
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (cataloging 
many more entrenched practices in state criminal courts that violate defendants’ constitutional 
rights). 
 5. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Missouri Suburbs Sued Over Gauntlet of 
Traffic Fines and Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A8 (describing law suit challenging municipal 
policies resulting in routine jailing of the poor). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnography of inner-
city Philadelphia is also replete with examples of how basic liberty rights are routinely violated 
by urban criminal justice systems. See generally ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE 
IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).  
 6. A 2002 Bureau of Justice national survey estimated that police used force against 
individuals on 664,500 instances annually, and that approximately 587,000 of those usages were 
perceived to be excessive. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
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have no reliable way to know how often zoning officials, welfare 
bureaucrats, or prison guards act on unconstitutional grounds or 
discard mandatory procedures. 
So mundane and so frequent are violations of settled 
constitutional rules that federal courts plainly lack capacity to offer 
relief in all cases. True, federal courts need write no new law to 
resolve these cases. But even if the law is clear, there are, as 
Blackstone observed, “above a hundred of our lawsuits [that] arise 
from disputed facts, for one in which the law is doubted of.”7 Even if 
constitutional rules were wrought with crystalline transparency, the 
cost of factual adjudication means that not even a fraction of 
constitutional violations could be resolved in federal court. For this 
reason alone, the supposedly “settled and invariable principle” of 
public law, famously articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall, “that 
every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress”8 is increasingly elusive. 
Yet if some rationing of constitutional remedies is inevitable, 
how is it to be done—and, as importantly, by whom? This Article 
analyzes these how and who questions prompted by remedial scarcity 
in constitutional law. It advances two claims. First, the Court has 
developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional 
remedies ranging from constitutional tort to habeas to the 
exclusionary rule. In a previous article, I identified in passing this 
transubstantive migration, but did not comprehensively analyze its 
evolution or effects.9 Building on that work here, I develop a more 
extensive account of fault’s role in constitutional remediation. 
Second, I contend that standard accounts of the narrowing of 
constitutional remedies since the 1980s10 have omitted an important 
 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 8 (2007), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZW8-TJDT]. 
 7. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330 (spelling adjusted). 
 8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). In this passage, Chief Justice 
Marshall was discussing the common-law writ system, in which such a one-to-one 
correspondence between rights and remedies existed.  
 9. Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 582 (2014) 
(discussing the role of fault). A student note published later the same year also noted 
commonality of approaches across remedial domains, largely to criticize rather than to explain. 
See Thomas K.S. Fu, Note, Against Doctrinal Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 303–04 (2014).  
 10. The standard accounts focus on ideological change within the Court. See, e.g., David 
Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1239. 
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factor: Judicial independence both facilitates and motivates the fault-
based gatekeeping system in constitutional remedies. Of course, 
factors such as judicial ideology, the politics of crime, and beliefs 
about the moral worth of relevant rights-holding populations have 
played a role in crafting our law of constitutional remedies. In 
addition to these factors, I argue, the institutional independence of 
Article III tribunals can impede the realization of constitutional 
rights. 
The Article’s first contribution is to show how a gatekeeping 
fault rule emerged and assumed a supervisory role in titrating most 
individualized constitutional remedies.11 The term “fault” is a legal 
term of art requiring some definition.12 Following the Supreme Court, 
I use fault in a specific, narrow sense. In this constitutional remedies 
context, fault is used to pick out cases in which it was not possible for 
the offender to “reasonably believe” they were acting consistent with 
the Constitution.13 Identifying a mere constitutional violation is not 
enough. A fault-based gatekeeping rule requires constitutional 
litigants to have suffered a self-evident violation of a clear and 
unambiguously applicable constitutional rule.14 The magnitude of the 
legal error must be substantial. 
Fault so defined is a familiar element of constitutional tort 
doctrine in the form of the qualified immunity defense, and also a 
(less noticed) dimension of municipal liability doctrine.15 Fault has 
also spilled over into the substantive law of certain constitutional 
provisions that commonly form the basis of constitutional tort actions, 
such as the Due Process Clause. Less noticed still is fault’s contagious 
 
 11. See infra Part I (extending and substantiating this account).  
 12. Cf. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419–20 (2002) 
(exploring the overlapping meanings of fault and culpability). 
 13. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 98 (1989).  
 14. One might reasonably protest that the Court should employ a term such as 
“unreasonable fault,” but it has not done so. I shall not confuse matters by diverting from its 
terminology. 
 15. Professor John Jeffries has written a series of important articles identifying and 
defending the regulative role of fault in constitutional tort. See Jeffries, supra note 13, at 96–101; 
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 263 (2000) 
[hereinafter Jeffries, Disaggregating]; John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment 
and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for 
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209 (2013) (presenting “a unified theory of 
constitutional torts”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 
YALE L.J. 87, 98–100 (1999). Jeffries, however, has not extended the analysis beyond the 
constitutional tort context as this Article seeks to do.  
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spread into contiguous remedial contexts and even some substantive-
law domains.16 Since the late 1980s, it has come to dominate the law of 
postconviction relief for prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.17 Further, it 
is increasingly the main gatekeeping rule for criminal defendants 
seeking a suppression remedy after a Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
violation.18 One consequence of fault’s ascendency within the 
doctrinal framework of constitutional remedies is that the modal 
question in constitutional litigation today is no longer whether the 
Constitution has been violated. Rather, it is whether the violation was 
sufficiently clear and self-evident to warrant expending scarce judicial 
resources. 
Why has this version of fault, which hinges on the violation’s 
clarity at the time it occurred and which plainly favors the state, 
become the organizing principle of remedial rationing? The Article’s 
second contribution is a causal hypothesis: One of the important, yet 
wholly overlooked, causes of the fault-based rationing system for 
constitutional remedies is the institutional independence of the 
judiciary.19 Leading accounts of constitutional remedies stress the role 
of ideological interests and historical circumstances in shaping the 
path of constitutional remedies.20 I do not revisit those claims. Rather, 
I add to those accounts by focusing on the important role that the 
judiciary’s institutional interests have played in shaping constitutional 
remedies. I aim to show how an account of recent constitutional 
doctrine without accounting for institutional interests is incomplete. 
 
 16. In charting the spillover of fault to the definition of substantive rights, I confess to 
stepping beyond my remedial remit in order to illuminate the doctrine better.  
 17. The law of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 largely tracks that of § 2254. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. By referring to judicial independence, I do not refer to the sense of “decisional 
independence of individual judges” but in the sense of “the institutional independence of the 
judiciary as a whole.” See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection 
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007). 
 20. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren 
and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983) (arguing that the Burger 
Court favored “judicial deregulation of state and federal criminal justice officials,” and showed 
“hostility to fair process norms that impair the state’s capacity to detect and punish the factually 
guilty”); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious 
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227 
(1971) (noting the “[i]deological ebb and flow” in the Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of 
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (arguing that 
the “Burger Court is undoubtedly more interested than its predecessor in using the criminal 
process to effect broadscale crime prevention and control” but also noting that these aspects of 
the Court had been overstated). 
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In particular, I propose that interests in judicial economy and 
prestige, in addition to ideological priorities in favor (or against) 
certain litigants, play a role. 
Supplementing leading accounts of constitutional remedies with 
such institutional considerations is of no mere antiquarian interest. It 
has contemporary ramifications. An account of remedial rationing 
based on ideological factors alone implies that changing the Court’s 
composition would lead to more available remedies. I predict 
otherwise. Rather, even a high court with a higher proportion of 
Democratic appointees would not behave all that differently. For 
whatever partisan flag they try to occlude, Justices of left and right 
alike have historically evinced a powerful allegiance to the 
institutional concerns of the Article III courts. 
The evidence I present for a causal link between judicial 
independence and remedial rationing is circumstantial. As a threshold 
matter, I demonstrate that the two standard reasons for explaining 
remedial rationing are incomplete. First, legislative action alone 
cannot explain the current doctrinal regime for redressing violations 
of individual constitutional rights. In many statutory domains, 
including civil rights, Congress has played a large role in creating and 
modifying remedies.21 Not so with many strictly constitutional 
remedies. Although Congress has influenced some remedial regimes, 
its most important interventions have come too late to have causal 
force, and they too often merely codified previously articulated 
judicial preferences.22 Second, ideological preferences over 
constitutional rights and rights-holding populations do not explain all 
doctrinal change. To a greater extent than appreciated, constitutional 
remedies have been narrowed by ideologically mixed coalitions of the 
Court. The poverty of both standard accounts points to the need for 
alternative explanations, and opens the way for a new accounting. 
I supplement standard accounts by highlighting the role of the 
judiciary’s institutional interests.23 The positive case for linking 
 
 21. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991) (“The 
Congress finds that . . . additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful 
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace . . . .”). 
 22. See Huq, supra note 9, at 531 n.44; see also infra text accompanying notes 216–218. 
 23. For an empirical account of the judiciary’s institutional development emphasizing the 
vast gains it has made in legitimacy and authority, see Kevin McGuire, The Institutionalization 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 128, 141 (2004). For a historical account also 
illustrating the steep gradient in institutional growth, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE 
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 224 (2012). 
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remedial rationing and judicial independence starts with the context 
in which the doctrine changed. The gatekeeping role of fault 
crystallized largely in the early 1980s. In this era, new pressures 
impinged on the Article III judiciary. These pressures arose from the 
contemporaneous rise of mass incarceration, which created 
metastasizing demands for criminal adjudication and postconviction 
review.24 Recent empirical work also shows that “institutional”25 
considerations often shape the Justices’ behavior, an influence that to 
date has been largely ignored. Indeed, Justices have explicitly, if 
occasionally, identified institutional interests as a motive for 
narrowing constitutional remedies.26 Finally, an analysis of the 
remedial contexts in which the Court has not extended the fault rule 
supports the inference that institutional incentives are at work in 
shaping the doctrine. 
This causal vector—from the judiciary’s institutional interests to 
remedial constriction—is not only missing from previous accounts, 
but is roughly the inverse of one standard account in the literature, 
offered by the late Professor William Stuntz. According to Stuntz, it 
was the generosity of federal constitutional remediation that induced 
legislatures to tilt toward more punitive policies.27 While recognizing 
this account as theoretically sophisticated and parsimonious, I 
supplement previous empirical criticisms28 by arguing that 
constitutional doctrine responded to—and did not cause—the 
massive changes in the volume and punitiveness of American criminal 
justice systems starting in the 1970s, with the judiciary’s institutional 
interests playing an important mediating role. 
 
 24. See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014). 
 25. Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate 
Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 323 (2007). 
 26. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It must 
prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He 
who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is 
not worth the search.”). 
 27. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]; see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 559–65 
(2001) (using the void-for-vagueness doctrine as an example of this dynamic). 
 28. For a devastating analysis of the empirics of Stuntz’s claims, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049–60 
(2013). 
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The principal aims of this Article are descriptive: the 
identification and diagnosis of an immanent rationing principle 
governing much constitutional remedies doctrine, and the 
development of an argument, supported by several strands of 
circumstantial evidence, of one important causal force. This analysis, 
important on its own terms, also clears ground for normative 
reevaluation of what role federal courts can play, or ought to play, in 
the enforcement of settled constitutional rules. Perhaps most 
importantly, it should unsettle some persistently unexamined truisms 
of constitutional law. Conventional Separation of Powers 
jurisprudence takes for granted that the independence of Article III 
judges exists “‘not to benefit the judges,’ but ‘as a limitation imposed 
in the public interest’ . . . by helping to secure an independence of 
mind and spirit necessary if judges are ‘to maintain that nice 
adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which 
constitutes political liberty.’”29 As recently as March 2015, members 
of the Court have pronounced without contradiction that “the 
‘separation of powers’ . . . [is] essential to the protection of individual 
liberty.”30 This truism assumes an alignment between judicial 
incentives and the vindication of “individual rights” and “political 
liberty.” But Separation of Powers theory is peculiarly silent on how 
that alignment might occur, or why institutional incentives would 
necessarily conduce to the vindication of rights.31 This Article’s 
account of remedial rationing in the shadow of judicial independence 
demonstrates that judicial incentives and the interests of 
constitutional-rights holders need not run together. Instead, they not 
only can, but do, diverge sharply as a result of the judiciary’s 
 
 29. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001) (citations omitted); accord Evans v. 
Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249 (1920) (“The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a 
larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three great powers, the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in separate departments . . . .”). 
 30. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011)). 
 31. The failure of traditional Separation of Powers theory to specify a persuasive causal 
channel for claimed effects of institutional design has been noted in other contexts. For an 
application in the context of legislative/executive relations, see, for example, Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2324–25 
(2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party 
than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political agreement and 
disagreement.”). See also Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 1006, 1012 (2014) (expressing skepticism about the necessary connection between the 
functional separation of different elements of governmental power and the promotion of 
liberty). 
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institutional interests in prestige and docket management. These can 
stand starkly at odds with the rights-holding public’s concerns. This 
gap should provoke hesitation about canonical Separation of Powers 
assumptions. 
This Article’s analysis is limited along three dimensions. First, I 
focus here solely on constitutional claims, not statutory claims,32 and 
consider only courts’ power to issue relief that directly responds to a 
constitutional wrong.33 Such cases merit analysis because they 
comprise a significant slice of the federal docket.34 Second, my 
argument concerns federal courts as axiomatic loci for the vindication 
of federal constitutional rights.35 Of course, federal courts often stay 
their hand to allow state courts a first effort at resolving a 
constitutional issue,36 while state courts can also play a role in 
 
 32. Parallel accounts might be told in regard to other domains of public law. See, e.g., J. 
Maria Glover, The Disappearing Shadow of Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
Moreover, it is possible that the Court acts as if it has a heightened measure of policymaking 
discretion when it comes to constitutional remedies, as opposed to statutory forms with respect 
to which it purports to hew to congressional will. For this reason, the area of constitutional 
remedies with which I am concerned represents a particularly fertile perspective on judicial 
preferences and behavior. 
 33. My focus on remedies means that I also do not attend to other devices for limiting the 
flow of claims or reducing the costs of adjudication in this domain. One might also look at 
attorney’s fees. For example, in Buckcannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), the Court interpreted the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 to permit fees awards only when a judgment, 
court-approved settlement, or some other order formally changed the legal relationship 
between the parties. In an equitable suit challenging an institutional practice after Buckcannon, 
defendants can litigate equitable claims to the point of judgment, and then avoid fees by 
consenting to the relief requested.  
 34. Prisoner cases, for example, take up about a fifth of the number of civil suits filed in 
district courts in recent years. See U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2013, U.S. COURTS, at 
tbl. 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx [http://
perma.cc/CBV6-PZ8L]. 
 35. Hence, this Article does not address the different ways in which structural 
constitutional values might be enforced. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural 
Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1499–1514 (2013) (analyzing the choice between public and 
private enforcement of structural constitutional values). 
 36. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1971) (limiting the availability of 
pretrial federal injunctive relief against state criminal process). The role of state courts was 
especially important in the early Republic. See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1109, 1142 (1969) (“Despite their remedial deficiencies, it was the state courts that were 
looked to [before 1875] for the vindication of constitutional rights, subject to review by the 
Supreme Court.”). For an example of path-marking state-court action on constitutional rights, 
see Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004–05 (Mass. 2003) 
(recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under state constitutional law). 
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vindicating constitutional entitlements.37 But even if state courts are 
“presumed competent to resolve federal issues,”38 they cannot play a 
comprehensive role. State courts cannot issue mandatory writs 
against federal officials,39 or free a federal prisoner from unlawful 
confinement.40 Further, federal courts by “consensus” play a 
dominant role today in constitutional remediation.41 Enforcement of 
constitutional rights by the executive branch, while important, is also 
inconstant.42 Finally, this Article analyzes the remedial function of the 
federal courts, not its distinct role in defining rights.43 This focus on 
constitutional remedies builds upon an emerging body of scholarship 
recognizing that questions of “what to do about a completed or 
threatened violation of law” are “distinct from the question of 
whether there has been or is about to be a violation.”44 
 
 37. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985) (expressing “confidence that state judges, no 
less than their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to protect the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants”); see also Giovanna Shay, The New State 
Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 (2013) (noting that state postconviction proceedings 
“are being forced to assume a new role in the development of federal constitutional criminal 
procedure”). 
 38. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988).  
 39. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821) (holding that a federal 
official’s “conduct could only be controlled by the power that created him”). 
 40. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 506, 524 (1859). 
 41. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 
107 YALE L.J. 77, 81, 111–25 (1997) (arguing that there is a “consensus that the federal courts 
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights”). 
 42. The executive branch, for example, wields large authority over determinations of how 
laws are enforced and defended from constitutional attack, supplying a nonjudicial forum for 
rights vindication. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1001, 1001–02 (2012) (discussing modalities of executive enforcement of the 
Constitution). A 1994 statute also vests the Department of Justice with authority to force 
institutional reform in police departments. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (authorizing the Justice 
Department to seek injunctive relief against departments with a pattern of unconstitutional 
conduct). But § 14141’s deployment is neither uniform nor comprehensive. Even with executive 
aid, the federal judiciary still provides a unique fulcrum from which rights can be leveraged. 
 43. For examples of scholarship that explores how courts define rights in optimal or 
suboptimal ways, compare Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1978) (describing and 
criticizing underenforcement of equal protection norms), with Emily Sherwin, Judges as 
Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2006) (defending the common-law method of 
generating constitutional rules). 
 44. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became A Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164–
65 (2008). For work focusing on the interaction between remedial design and the substance of 
constitutional rights, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and 
Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 244–45 (considering interactions between changes in exclusionary rule 
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The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I establishes the 
centrality of fault in the rationing of three individualized 
constitutional remedies—money-damages actions, postconviction 
relief from unconstitutionally imposed criminal sentences, and the 
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment. Part II turns to the etiology of fault’s regulative role. I 
argue that the rise of fault cannot be ascribed solely to Congress or 
the shifting ideological preferences of the Justices—perhaps the two 
most obvious alternatives. I then offer positive evidence to support 
the hypothesis that one of its underappreciated causes is judicial 
independence. Part III then examines some normative consequences 
of this link between judicial independence and the regulative role of 
fault. In particular, I suggest that the account of remedial rationing 
offered here casts doubt on some central assumptions in Separation 
of Powers jurisprudence. 
I.  FAULT AND THE RATIONING OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
This Part advances the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court 
has installed a requirement of fault as a threshold gatekeeping rule 
for constitutional remedies. This fault rule arose in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. It diffused from constitutional tort law to postconviction 
habeas law and the rules governing the exclusionary rule as a remedy 
for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. It has also seeped into 
the substantive law in some domains. In its modal form, the fault-
based gatekeeping rule observed across these domains requires that 
an individual litigant must demonstrate that the relevant 
constitutional violation was clear and unambiguous at the moment of 
the alleged violation in order to access either trial or a remedial order. 
A fault rule of this kind emerged first from constitutional tort 
law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and so-called Bivens suits;45 spread to the 
 
doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine for the development of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) (suggesting the Court’s impetus for 
“conceiving of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from 
constitutional tort doctrine). 
 45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396–97 (1971). Under Bivens, the Court created a private cause of action for money damages 
against federal officials in their personal capacity who violate certain constitutional rules. Bivens 
involved a Fourth Amendment violation; the Court has subsequently been “circumspect” about 
extending the Bivens cause of action to other contexts. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, 
Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 118 (2009).  
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exclusionary rule in Fourth and (increasingly) Fifth Amendment 
contexts; and also to postconviction review of state and federal 
convictions.46 I should be explicit here that this list does not cover the 
waterfront of constitutional remedies. Indeed, I shall argue in Part II 
that the Court has conspicuously failed to extend the fault rule to 
other sorts of constitutional challenges.47 So my claim here is not that 
the Court has evinced blanket skepticism or hostility to constitutional 
remediation. Rather, I aim here to chart the domain in which the 
Court has erected barriers to some forms of relief—domains in which 
the demand for remediation is especially steep—while bracketing 
consideration of why that rule has not been extended further until 
Part II. 
To analyze the regulative function of fault in constitutional 
remedies, I begin by briefly summarizing how the remedial 
mechanisms at issue evolved from, and superseded, a common-law 
framework of constitutional enforcement mechanisms. Unlike 
previous accounts, I underscore the migration of rationing rules from 
the familiar context of qualified immunity into not just some domains 
of constitutional law, but also parallel remedial mechanisms such as 
the exclusionary rule and postconviction habeas.48 Moreover, unlike 
previous recountings, my account deliberately underscores the fact 
that fault has become central not because of legislative choice, but 
rather as a consequence of unbounded judicial policy discretion. The 
fact that judges, rather than policymakers in the political branches, 
have been at the forefront in responding to the problem of remedial 
scarcity in constitutional law is central to the causal link between 
judicial independence and remedial rationing that I develop at length 
in Part II. 
A. The Remedial Dispensation for Individualized Constitutional 
Wrongs 
The current dispensation for constitutional remediation is of 
relatively recent vintage. From the Republic’s founding until the early 
 
 46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief to 
prisoners); id. §§ 2254, 2255 (setting forth, respectively, rules for state prisoners and federal 
prisoners). 
 47. See infra Part II.B. 
 48. This is called “borrowing” by Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional 
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an 
interpretive practice characterized by a deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields 
for persuasive ends”). 
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twentieth century, courts enforced constitutional rules largely via 
state-law tort and contract actions for damages into which federal-law 
elements could be injected.49 Even the federal government could be 
brought into constitutional compliance using a common-law action 
such as ejectment.50 Constitutional adjudication would typically arise 
in common-law contexts when a state defendant endeavored to 
deflect liability in pointing to a source of official authority and the 
plaintiff in response involved the Constitution to pierce that defense.51 
In these early cases, the courts’ role was limited to determining 
whether the conduct in litigation was lawful and then deciding 
whether “to award damages.”52 It was then up to the legislature to 
determine whether to indemnify the defendant official.53 
This common-law system of enforcement “dwindled”54 over time 
for several interlocking reasons. First, state-law tort actions raising 
constitutional issues “by ‘imperceptible steps’ came to be seen as 
federal causes of action” by the end of the nineteenth century.55 
Second, federal judges in the mid-1800s began to invoke with 
increasing frequency inchoate conceptions of immunity to deflect 
private suits against state actors, with the result that common-law 
damages actions for constitutional violations “atroph[ied].”56 Third, 
 
 49. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How it 
Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 134 (2012) (noting that the 
Constitution was originally “to be implemented through remedies available for violations of 
common law rights”); Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 79–81. 
 50. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882–86 (1970) 
(describing this practice).  
 51. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 134 (noting that “for much of the nation’s 
history, state common law provided victims with a right of action that . . . could eventually result 
in the vindication of their constitutional rights” by treating the constitutional violation as 
“invalidat[ing] any authority conferred by federal law”). 
 52. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: 
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 
1868 (2010); see also Bowden v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 1032, 1032 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1876) (No. 1,715) 
(“Except in cases where property is taxed, or otherwise taken for public purposes, [government 
cannot deprive a person of rights without] suit in a court of justice.”). 
 53. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 52, at 1867 (noting that “reimbursement of a well-founded 
claim [was viewed] more as a matter of right than as a matter of legislative grace”). 
 54. Kian, supra note 49, at 134. 
 55. Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 101. 
 56. Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 396, 422–29, 450–51 (1987). For example, ejectment actions against the federal 
government, once common, came to seem eccentric, even impermissible. See, e.g., Malone v. 
Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962) (disallowing ejectment action against federal officer to 
recover real property in the absence of a claim that the officer’s conduct violated the 
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the post–Civil War economic boom led to a wave of regulation that in 
turn fed demand for property-right-like protections against 
unconstitutional state action that could not be satisfied via the 
traditional common-law forms.57 Finally, the common-law writ system 
itself fell into desuetude as simplified pleading, embodied in the 1934 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came to dominate judicial 
practice.58 
To fill the gap left by common-law actions, federal courts drew 
upon statutory causes of action and innovated to create new remedial 
pathways. This Part focuses on three remedial pathways, all of special 
relevance for vindicating individuals’ constitutional rights against 
routine unconstitutional actions by line police officers, prosecutors, 
and bureaucrats. These three mechanisms are constitutional tort 
actions, postconviction habeas actions, and motions for the exclusion 
of unconstitutionally secured evidence in the course of a criminal 
investigation. 
These remedies have important commonalities. Each targets a 
discrete official action usually focused on a particular individual, not a 
policy or statutory command, and seeks an individualized remedy 
(e.g., money, evidentiary suppression, or release). Each has roots in 
the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, quickly fell 
into desuetude, and then did not see vigorous usage until the 1960s.59 
Together, they comprised the remedial side of the Warren Court’s 
aggressive campaign to install the Bill of Rights and rein in states’ and 
localities’ police, prosecutors, prison officials, and petty bureaucrats. 
The Court’s reconstruction of constitutional remedies had three 
prongs. First, the Court fashioned two constitutional tort remedies for 
use against state and federal actors. In 1961 the Court in Monroe v. 
 
Constitution); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687–88 (1949) 
(barring claim against federal officer to enjoin breach of contract). 
 57. Woolhandler, supra note 56, at 452 (“[T]he change in the types of property that 
increasingly became the subject of government regulation may have been partly responsible for 
the modern dichotomy between damages and injunctive relief.”). 
 58. See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2012)); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1987) (exploring “the 
revolutionary character of the decision inherent in the Federal Rules to make equity procedure 
available for all cases”). 
 59. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1533 (1972) (commenting almost contemporaneously on the expansion in remedial 
resources in the individual rights context in this era). 
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Pape60 revived a civil-damages remedy created by the Reconstruction-
era Ku Klux Klan Act.61 The provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allowed for 
money-damages actions against state actors that violated the 
Constitution.62 Until this date, § 1983 had not been an effectual 
response to unconstitutional state action because courts had required 
that plaintiffs show state-law authorization for an alleged 
unconstitutional act.63 One study of § 1983’s first sixty-five years of 
enactment found only nineteen instances of the statute resulting in a 
reported decision.64 When courts did consider its effect, federal judges 
typically failed to impose any effectual remedial consequences.65 
After Monroe had reinterpreted § 1983 to reach both authorized and 
unauthorized actions of state officials the discrete, discretionary, and 
dispersed actions of state and municipal frontline officials became 
plausible subjects of judicial review for constitutional compliance. In 
the forty years after Monroe, the volume of constitutional damages 
actions filed pursuant to § 1983 increased by two orders of 
magnitude.66 That growth was abetted by the Court’s 1978 decision to 
expand government tort liability by permitting suits against 
municipalities where “the action is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements or executes” a law or policy.67 
Supplementing the Court’s novel regulation of frontline state 
officials was a new willingness to review the constitutionality of 
discretionary decisions by federal officials interacting with citizens. 
Congress had enacted no civil action for constitutional torts actions 
against federal officials parallel to § 1983. Nevertheless, the Court in 
1971 inferred a damage remedy directly from the Constitution in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
 
 60. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 61. Ku Klux Klan Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012)). 
 62. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.  
 63. Id. (rejecting the then-dominant position that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allowed suit only when 
the alleged constitutional violation was authorized by state law).  
 64. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969). 
 65. See, e.g., Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283, 290 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891) (describing statute as 
purely “declaratory,” creating no new rights or modes of proceeding).  
 66. Rudovsky, supra note 10, at 1208 (noting that the number of non-prisoner civil-rights 
suits increased from 150 in 1961 to 42,354 in 1998).  
 67. Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (ruling on a policy that 
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence).  
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Narcotics.68 Notably, Bivens concerned the Fourth Amendment rights 
of a putative drug dealer during an FBI raid on his home69—the same 
kind of routine, hard-to-observe official exercise of discretion that 
§ 1983 also distinctly addressed. Although the Supreme Court evinces 
persistent leeriness of expanding the availability of damages actions 
against federal officials in new contexts,70 the Bivens remedy remains 
a hardy perennial in the lower courts. Recent empirical work suggests 
Bivens actions succeed between 17–34 percent of the time.71 Section 
1983 and Bivens actions thus provide foundations for a robust body of 
constitutional torts jurisprudence. 
The second expansion of constitutional remedies also occurred in 
1961, when the Court in Mapp v. Ohio72 expanded the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule remedy which had, until then, only 
availed defendants in federal courts73 to also cover prosecutions in 
state courts.74 Then, as now, it was state officials, not federal officials, 
who were tasked with the lion’s share of policing. Incorporation of 
the exclusionary rule meant that that Court’s 1949 incorporation of 
Fourth Amendment rights in Wolf v. Colorado75 had practical effect 
where previously it has been, in effect, a dead letter.76 Five years after 
imposing the exclusionary rule against the states in the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the 
 
 68. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–
97 (1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages under Fourth Amendment). 
 69. For details about Webster Bivens and the search challenged in that case, see James E. 
Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 275–77 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 
2009). 
 70. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a 
good deal more circumspect” in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts). 
 71. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences 
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842–46 (2010). 
 72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 73. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914) (unanimously applying the 
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions). 
 74. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 (describing the exclusionary rule as “part and parcel” of the 
Fourth Amendment). The Court has subsequently repudiated this account of the exclusionary 
rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  
 75. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 76. Id. at 28 (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states). In Irvine v. 
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which the U.S. Supreme Court itself explicitly recommended 
a federal prosecution for criminal trespass against local officials who had violated the 
incorporated Fourth Amendment, no remedy was to be had. There was no investigation. The 
Department failed even to open a file on the matter. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: 
The Court That Cried “Wolf,” 77 MISS. L.J. 467, 492–97 (2007) (discussing Irvine). 
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Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against coerced testimony. In 
Miranda v. Arizona,77 the Court installed a prophylactic regime of 
oral warnings in the police-interrogation context with enforcement 
again flowing through an exclusionary rule.78 
Exclusionary rules in these contexts do not, strictly speaking, 
remedy the privacy, dignity, and security harms that the relevant 
constitutional provisions seek to prevent, but rather have been 
explained as vehicles for deterrence.79 To that extent, my terminology 
of “remedies” is imprecise. Nevertheless, not all remedies place 
litigants precisely in the position they would have been in absent a 
wrong occurring.80 Exclusion is fairly ranked as a remedy to the extent 
it is sought by a putatively injured party, and purports to eliminate an 
advantage that the state as counterparty possesses as a consequence 
of the constitutional wrong. 
Finally—and roughly contemporaneously with these 
developments in constitutional tort law and the exclusionary rule—
the midcentury Court also breathed new life into the writ of habeas 
corpus as a postconviction remedy for constitutional criminal 
procedure violations. For almost the first century of the Republic, the 
habeas writ was not available as a postconviction remedy.81 It was 
employed on rare occasions as a preemptive shield against criminal 
prosecution.82 Only in 1867 did Congress expand the writ to 
encompass review of state convictions.83 The 1867 statute, though, was 
not followed by a expansion in habeas challenges. It was not until a 
series of four decisions starting in 1953 with Brown v. Allen84 that 
procedural constraints on habeas review withered.85 In the following 
 
 77. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 78. Id. at 447–48.  
 79. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 796 (1994). 
 80. Consider the persistent refusal of courts to give unforeseeable consequential damages 
for contract violations. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ct.). 
 81. Cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (not extending habeas to 
postconviction review). 
 82. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). 
 83. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86. 
 84. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).  
 85. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 56–57 (2011) (describing 
causes and size of shift in postconviction habeas filings).  
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four decades, the volume of habeas litigation lodged by state 
prisoners engorged even more dramatically than § 1983 filings.86 
It is important to reiterate here that the three remedies identified 
here do not cover the waterfront of potential judicial mechanisms for 
enforcing the Constitution. Indeed, an important element of Part II’s 
argument will focus on how exceptions to the fault rule create 
incentives over the kind of constitutional suits litigants file. To 
anticipate that discussion, it is worth noting here the two most 
important alternatives to damages—exclusion and habeas relief—are 
vehicles for individuals to secure some judicial response for a 
constitutional wrong. 
First, at least since the 1907 decision in Ex Parte Young,87 federal 
courts have issued injunctions against state officials barring them 
from civil or criminal enforcement of a state law when enforcement 
will violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.88 Today, plaintiffs 
invoking Young can allege an ongoing violation of federal law and 
obtain prospective relief without regard to state sovereign immunity.89 
Second, in 1934, Congress enacted the federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act,90 pursuant to which plaintiffs could secure relief against state 
actors even when an injunction could not be obtained.91 Injunctive or 
 
 86. Id. at 60. The rise in habeas filings is likely a consequence of the dramatic expansion in 
incarceration that characterizes federal and state criminal justice policy since the beginning of 
the 1970s. See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 12–15 
(2006). The rise of mass incarceration also led to a sharp rise in the volume of prisoner 
litigation. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1578–87 (2003) 
(documenting evidence). 
 87. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 88. The pivotal case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 148 (authorizing injunction against 
unconstitutional state action absent specific statutory authorization for that remedy), but federal 
courts issued injunctions against unconstitutional state action long before Young. See Edwin M. 
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 19 n.70 (1924) (collecting cases dating 
from 1838). 
 89. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011); accord 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Congress, however, 
can foreclose a Young injunctive remedy by enacting a sufficiently specific statutory scheme. 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–76 (1996). Further, Young cannot be used to 
obtain funds from a state’s treasury, or order specific performance of a State’s contract. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974) (recognizing that Young does not allow relief 
against a state officer); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502 (1887) (“A bill in equity for the specific 
performance of the contract against the state by name, it is admitted could not be brought.”). 
 90. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955. 
 91. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that declaratory relief was 
available even though the threatened state criminal prosecution could not be enjoined). For an 
argument that the gap between injunctive and declaratory relief is elusive, see Samuel L. Bray, 
The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1095 (2014). 
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declaratory relief is of limited utility in many instances. When a 
constitutional violation is inflicted without prior notice, and where the 
damage is immediately realized—as is often the case when police, 
prosecutors, and bureaucrats are concerned—then neither an 
injunction nor a declaratory judgment will be of great use. In such 
cases, the vindication of individual constitutional rights will generally 
hinge on whether an individual litigant can avail themselves of a 
constitutional tort action, a suppression motion, or a postconviction 
remedy. Absent these tools, a constitutional violation will have no 
legal or practical consequence. 
B. Fault in Constitutional Tort Law 
But when do plaintiffs have access to remedies such as damages, 
suppression, or habeas relief? Since the mid-1970s, the Court has 
rationed the availability of each of these three remedies by installing 
a threshold requirement that individual rights claimants must 
typically demonstrate that an offending state official not only violated 
the Constitution, but did so in an especially flagrant and obvious way. 
That is, it is often no longer sufficient to allege a violation of the 
Constitution. It is also necessary to allege that the violation of the 
Constitution was especially clear and unambiguous so as to warrant 
the expense of trial and the imposition of liability. The Court has 
framed this threshold requirement as one of “fault” or “culpability.”92 
Although the latter term can be used to mark out the distinctive 
aspect of conduct warranting criminal, but not civil penalties,93 I 
nonetheless follow the Court’s usage of the imprecise term “fault.” 
To emphasize, I use that term solely to identify conduct in which the 
constitutional violation is unambiguously clear ex ante, and not to 
gesture toward an inchoate notion of moral blameworthiness. That is, 
the term fault in this context does not pick out any facts about the 
defendant’s state of mind.94 
 
 92. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1997) (using the terms “fault” 
and “culpability” almost interchangeably); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 
(1989) (requiring “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights). 
 93. Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 79, 94 (2008) (noting that “moral culpability” characterizes criminal conduct, but not 
conduct to which civil penalties attach).  
 94. The Court, that is, could plausibly (and with some gain in accuracy) have used a term 
such as “unreasonable fault,” but it did not, and to innovate in terminology here would be 
confusing. 
HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/2015  11:46 AM 
2015] RATIONING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 21 
The move toward fault is clearest in the constitutional tort 
context, and it is there I start. Within this doctrinal domain, fault is a 
familiar element of qualified immunity doctrine, but it also plays a 
central regulative role in municipal liability doctrine, and even in the 
substantive law defining some of the constitutional torts most 
commonly enforced through § 1983 and Bivens actions. But 
conventional accounts of this doctrine miss two points that I stress in 
the following account of qualified immunity and cognate fault rules in 
constitutional tort law. First, the fault role stands on no legislative 
foundation, but is rather a function of relatively freewheeling judicial 
policymaking discretion. Second, although notionally explained as a 
way of making officials’ tasks easier, the fault rule in constitutional 
tort serves also to mitigate pressure upon judicial effort and 
resources. 
1. Fault as the Operative Principle of Qualified Immunity.  No 
federal statute creates immunity from tort liability in officer suits 
pursuant to § 1983 or Bivens. Rather, official immunity is the Justices’ 
creation. This is most clearly evident in the incremental fashion it has 
emerged, a pathway that bears the clear fingerprints of conscious 
judicial policymaking, rather than any fidelity to legislative intent.95 
Initially, qualified immunity was modest in theory and effect. The 
Court in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray96 first granted immunity to 
officers acting pursuant to a state statute later held unconstitutional 
on the ground that such immunity was a “settled principle of law” 
that Congress had not meant to abolish when enacting the Ku Klux 
Klan Act.97 Both Pierson’s holding and its reasoning were 
circumscribed. First, only official actions taken “in good faith,” and, 
with respect to police, on the basis of “probable cause” secured an 
exception from liability.98 That is, the ex ante existence of some 
positive legal authority for an official act seemed key to immunity. 
Second, the Court recognized only such immunity as existed at 
common law, and then only because it presumed that Congress did 
 
 95. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233–61 
(2006) (providing a chronological account of the development of immunity doctrines). 
 96. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 97. Id. at 553–54 (noting that “Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished 
to abolish” qualified immunity for police officers); accord Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 
379 (1951). 
 98. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555. 
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not lightly unsettle “solidly established” common-law principles.99 
Legislative intent, therefore, was the touchstone of Pierson’s analysis. 
In 1975, the Court in Wood v. Strickland100 began to modify the 
theoretical foundations, if not the scope, of immunity. Such immunity, 
explained the Wood Court, applied so long as officers act in good 
faith without malicious intent, and neither reasonably know, nor 
reasonably should have known, of its illegality.101 Wood did not move 
far from Pierson’s focus on the existence of positive legal authority. 
Yet rather than locating its immunity rule in the common law, the 
Court looked directly to “strong public-policy” considerations for its 
justification.102 In particular, the Wood Court conjured the concern 
that “even the most conscientious . . . decisionmaker [would be 
deterred] from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and 
in a manner best serving the long-term interest of the [state] school 
and the students.”103 
Subsequent immunity opinions acknowledged Pierson’s 
foundation in background tort rules defeasible only by clear 
congressional statement.104 But the Court’s later expansions of 
qualified immunity rapidly came unmoored from Pierson’s historical 
anchorage. The doctrine instead gained momentum from the express 
invocation of policy considerations. The result was a shift in 
immunity’s breadth: Where Pierson intimated that immunity availed 
if the official could point to the existence of a positive source of 
plausible authority for a challenged act, later cases took as a 
touchstone the absence of a prohibitory source of law. This pivot 
dramatically engorged immunity’s reach, albeit without any clear 
normative justification from the Court. 
Seven years later, the Court invoked the same deterrence-related 
policy concern, but in so doing expanded the substantive reach of 
qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,105 the Court invoked 
 
 99. Id. at 553–54. 
 100. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
 101. See id. at 322. 
 102. Id. at 318; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07 (1978) (relying on “considerations 
of public policy” to delimit qualified immunity). For an earlier recognition of the public policy 
foundations of qualified immunity doctrine, see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). 
 103. Wood, 420 U.S. at 319–21 (“[T]here must be a degree of immunity if the work of the 
[state institution] is to go forward . . . .”). 
 104. Hence, the Court has relied on common-law principles to extend absolute immunity to 
prosecutors, see Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976), and also to permit punitive 
damages, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). 
 105. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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again deterrence-related public policy considerations, but abandoned 
Wood’s subjective good-faith requirement.106 The Harlow Court 
instead shielded officials from liability unless their conduct “violate[d] 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”107 That is, immunity would 
attach in the absence of a clear prohibition—rather than (as in 
Pierson) in the presence of a clear authorization. In a subsequent 
case, the Court further refined the Harlow test by insisting that it 
would be applied to allegations in the most “particularized” sense 
possible, that is, that the illegality of an alleged constitutional 
violation must be starkly “apparent” to the defendant.108 Today, the 
Court characterizes qualified immunity as protecting “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and not 
merely those who (as in Pierson) reasonably rely on the 
constitutionality of a prior statutory enactment.109 As far as money 
damages are concerned, the Constitution is a hazard only for the 
blunderer and the fool.110 
In comparison to its antecedent in Pierson, the current iteration 
of qualified immunity has two important qualities. First, since Wood, 
the Court has made no pretense of mining the common law or 
legislative intent for direction, but has engaged in naked 
policymaking. The demand for particularity, for example, is grounded 
solely on first-order consequentialist analysis of tort’s feedback effect 
on official action.111 Second, notwithstanding the pragmatic 
foundation of the doctrine, the proffered justifications for qualified 
immunity do not well explain its actual scope. The Court has 
repeatedly expressed alarm about tort’s potential chilling effect on 
 
 106. Id. at 818. 
 107. Id.; see also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (anticipating the rule in 
Harlow).  
 108. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); accord Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 
2012, 2023 (2014). The effect of qualified immunity will therefore be greatest when the Court 
relies on standards rather than rules. Application of the former rarely requires a new rule, 
United States v. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107–08 (2013), in a way that would satisfy Anderson’s 
particularity requirement.  
 109. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1985)). 
 110. Sounding an even more alarmist note, Chen argues that the Court has conflated 
qualified immunity with absolute immunity. Chen, supra note 95, at 275. 
 111. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 (“An immunity that has as many variants as there are 
modes of official action and types of rights would not give conscientious officials that assurance 
of protection that it is the object of the doctrine to provide.”). The Anderson Court does not cite 
or discuss any common-law antecedents for its rule. 
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official action.112 But the Court has never explained how that 
overdeterrence rationale motivates the move from Pierson’s demand 
for positive law to Harlow’s search for a clear prohibition. Worse, the 
Court has never offered any empirical evidence that overdeterrence is 
in fact a problem. Recent empirical work on indemnification of tort 
actions in the policing context confirms that, at least in that context, 
indemnification is “virtually always” available,113 even when the 
officer in question has violated both the Constitution and relevant 
criminal law.114 Indeed, many jurisdictions do not even have a 
mechanism to transmit information gained through lawsuits to police 
departments that employ serial rights offenders.115 Although this data 
has only become available recently, earlier studies reached 
substantially parallel results.116 Both recent and older studies hence 
suggest that it has never been the case that individual officials are 
likely to pay from their own pockets. This means not only that the 
Court’s overdeterrence argument based on the direct effect of money 
damages is not persuasive as a matter of fact.117 It also means that the 
central element of the qualified immunity edifice was one asserted 
without foundation by the government, and accepted on the basis of 
mere governmental ipse dixit by the Court. The Court has built a 
comprehensive, transubstantive doctrinal framework for limiting 
constitutional remedies without ever asking whether its basic 
empirical predicate held true. 
 
 112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 113. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) 
(“Between 2006 and 2011, in forty-four of the country’s largest jurisdictions, officers financially 
contributed to settlements and judgments in just .41% of the approximately 9,225 civil rights 
damages actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, and their contributions amounted to just .02% of 
the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases.”). 
 114. Id. at 923–95. 
 115. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in 
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1028–30 (2010) (finding that law 
enforcement agencies rarely gather and analyze information from lawsuits brought against them 
and their officers). 
 116. See, e.g., Lant B. Davis et al., Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 
781, 810–12 (1979) (reporting government defense and indemnification of police officers in 
Connecticut); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort 
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding no cases in which “an individual official 
had borne the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment”). 
 117. Qualified immunity might be defended based on officials’ risk aversion arising from the 
prospect of adverse career consequences, selection effects, and the distribution of political costs. 
Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 15, at 267–68. But even advocates of these arguments 
concede that they rest on “fundamentally speculative” empirical grounds. Id. at 268.  
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Even if the reason the Court gives for its currently robust 
iteration of qualified immunity fails, there is an obvious alternative. 
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability.”118 It is designed to “permit the defeat of 
insubstantial claims without resort to trial.”119 So powerful is this 
preference for pretrial resolution of constitutional tort claims that the 
Court has crafted a textual exception to the general prohibition on 
interlocutory appeals when qualified immunity is denied.120 Qualified 
immunity therefore does not merely economize on the litigation 
expenses of public officials, it also rations out judicial resources with 
increasing care.121 And whereas the overdeterrence-related 
justification for qualified immunity rests on elusive, and perhaps false, 
empirical supposition, the judicial-economy justification for qualified 
immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true. 
2. Fault’s Spillovers from Constitutional Tort Doctrine.  The fault 
rule embedded in today’s qualified immunity law has leaked from its 
original locus in constitutional tort doctrine into three contexts where 
the Court’s overdeterrence concern plainly does not apply. These 
spillovers further undermine the conclusion that deterrence concerns 
explain the domain of tort-related fault. 
First, at least formally, the protections of qualified immunity do 
not apply to tort actions against municipalities.122 Nevertheless, 
current doctrine requires a showing that a municipal defendant not 
only violated a constitutional rule, but affirmatively chose to ignore a 
clear constitutional prohibition. In Board of County Commissioners v. 
Brown,123 the Court stated, without explanation or elaboration, that 
“rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to 
municipal liability cases.”124 This demand has had the greatest 
practical force in cases alleging municipal liability based on improper 
 
 118. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 526 (1985)). 
 119. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 
299, 305–06 (1996). 
 120. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (extending government officers a right 
to interlocutory appellate review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense). 
 121. It is worth noting that the Court has not required state courts to follow Mitchell’s 
exception from the rule against interlocutory appeals. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913 
(1997).  
 122. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624–25 (1980). 
 123. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 390 (1997). 
 124. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).  
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training or supervision. Such liability can be established only by 
showing a constitutional deficiency was “so obvious, and the 
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights” 
that policymakers could be said to be “deliberately indifferent.”125 
That is, it extended the fault role (understood once more not as a 
demand for blameworthiness but rather a gross form of constitutional 
error) to facilitate threshold dismissal. 
For example, rejecting a recent suit challenging repeated 
prosecutorial misconduct in New Orleans, the Court set aside a jury 
finding of liability because the plaintiff had failed to show 
“[p]olicymakers’ continued adherence to an approach that they know 
or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct,” 
notwithstanding a string of cases in which state courts had reversed 
convictions based on the state’s misconduct.126 As the dissent noted, 
the trial record in that case evinced “the conceded, long-concealed 
prosecutorial transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.”127 In 
practice, this ruling means that moving a municipal liability claim 
from the pretrial stage to plenary courtroom proceeding requires 
strong threshold evidence of a persistent pattern of unconstitutional 
conduct amounting to intentional violation of the Constitution—
evidence that, in the majority of cases, will in practice be unavailable 
to most plaintiffs without discovery. 
Notwithstanding its rigorous enforcement of the fault rule in the 
municipal liability context, the Court has not explained why there is a 
need to avoid overdeterrence in such cases. Unlike individual 
officials, municipalities are comparatively well placed to internalize 
both the costs and benefits of constitutional violations, and thus not 
err on the side of excessive precaution.128 The current doctrine’s 
structure, by contrast, means that municipal entities will 
systematically fail to internalize the costs of unconstitutional actions. 
At the very least, there is some reason to think that municipal liability 
 
 125. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); see also St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 
U.S. 112, 124–27 (1988) (establishing a narrow definition of official policymakers for § 1983 
purposes). 
 126. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011). 
 127. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 128. Peter Schuck has argued that qualified immunity is warranted because officials do not 
internalize the upside gains from legally risky actions, and hence should not be required to 
internalize their costs in order to avoid asymmetries in their incentive structures. PETER H. 
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 59–81 (1983); see 
also Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 15, at 265–70. 
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should be more expansively available than individual officer liability 
if the focal concern is overdeterrence.129 The Court, in short, has not 
even tried to explain—and may not be able to explain—its extension 
of fault from the individual to the municipal liability context based on 
deterrence concerns. That extension, though, may alternatively fit an 
account pivoted on the need to titrate carefully judicial resources in a 
world where municipalities persistently violate the Constitution. 
Second, the Court has extended the fault rule from qualified 
immunity to challenges to unconstitutional taxes. Ex post remedies 
for an invalid tax are available only when “legislators would have 
good reason to suppose that enactment of the . . . tax would . . . 
violate their oath to uphold the United States Constitution.”130 
However this opaque judicial gloss is understood, a “good reason” 
standard extends the fault-based framework familiar from qualified 
immunity to a tax context in which concerns about overdeterrence are 
weak. Legislators responsible for taxation have staff, including 
lawyers, capable of sophisticated legal and constitutional analysis. It 
might be thought that doctrinal rules should incentivize a high degree 
of care among such legislators, rather than subsidizing carelessness. 
Moreover, in practice, this standard means states can throw up 
impediments that complicate challenges to unconstitutional taxes, 
often rendering many such challenges futile.131 If the justification for a 
fault-based safe harbor is the husbanding of judicial resources, by 
contrast, this extension of qualified immunity may seem more 
sensible. 
Third, starting in the early 1980s, the Court has fashioned a set of 
rules to limit constitutional tort actions for state deprivations of 
liberty and property interests in the absence of intentional or systemic 
state actions.132 In 1981, the Court imposed an exhaustion rule for tort 
suits based on a state official’s discretionary act depriving a person of 
property—a charge most common in the policing and incarceration 
 
 129. For a development of this point, see Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for 
Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 646 (1999). 
 130. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, 
J.). 
 131. See Amy Silverstein, The Rewards and Frustrations of Successful Constitutional 
Challenges to State Taxes, 87 J. TAX’N 102, 102 (1997) (noting that “success on the merits does 
not always result in a refund of the unconstitutional taxes,” and listing a variety of grounds upon 
which refunds have been denied). 
 132. For a summary of this jurisprudence, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions 
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 345–
52 (1993). 
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contexts.133 In the 1986 Daniels v. Williams134 decision, for example, 
the Court held that merely negligent acts do not amount to a 
deprivation under the Due Process Clause.135 Like qualified immunity 
doctrine, Daniels and its progeny require an allegation that a 
defendant official has traduced an especially obvious and 
unambiguous constitutional rule to move past a threshold motion to 
dismiss to get to trial and potential liability. Mere negligence that 
extinguishes a life or destroys property yields no cause for 
remediation.136 That rule, though, applies only to “random and 
unauthorized” deprivations of liberty or property, which cannot be 
challenged until state remedies have been exhausted, but not in 
challenges to systematic policies that result in constitutional 
deprivations.137 That is, they apply precisely when the volume of suits 
demanding relief is likely to be greatest. 
This is also one of the rare instances in which one need not guess 
at the Court’s attention to its own institutional concerns. They are 
explicit on the surface of its opinions. The Court has repeatedly 
announced that § 1983 should not become a “font of tort law to be 
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered 
by the States.”138 The concern with federal caseload management—
even at the cost of allowing a tranche of constitutional violations to 
 
 133. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981) (holding that no due process deprivation 
has occurred if the state provides adequate postdeprivation process to remedy random, 
unauthorized acts of state officers), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 
(1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending Parratt’s exhaustion 
principle to intentional torts). 
 134. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 135. Id. at 329–30. 
 136. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1998) (“We have accordingly 
rejected the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability as any mark of sufficiently 
shocking conduct, and have held that the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part 
of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of 
constitutional due process.”). In practice, this means that rights holders, especially in 
comprehensively regulated environments (such as prisons, public housing, and the like) will 
have no federal remedy for a constitutional violation unless they can point to intent. Given the 
pervasive asymmetries in power and information between the public and the state in these 
contexts, it will often be the case that potential plaintiffs will have no intent evidence.  
 137. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137–38 (1990) (holding that Parratt does not 
apply when the deprivation was foreseeable and authorized—as distinct from random and 
unauthorized—and when predeprivation process would have been feasible); see also Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1982) (holding that postdeprivation remedies do 
not satisfy due process where deprivation is caused by established state procedures). 
 138. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Fallon, supra note 132, at 339 (noting 
and discussing repeated invocation of this concern).  
HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/2015  11:46 AM 
2015] RATIONING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 29 
pass without any effectual remedy, at least from a federal court—is 
visible on the surface. Moreover, it is presented without any effort to 
explain why the class of plaintiffs thereby deprived of a remedy are 
otherwise undeserving. Fault’s penumbral extensions in the 
constitutional tort context to municipal liability suits, challenges to 
unconstitutional state taxes, and random, unauthorized liberty or 
property deprivations therefore are not well explained by the motives 
evinced in Harlow and subsequent qualified immunity cases. 
C. Fault and the Exclusionary Rule 
Fault has also leaked from the constitutional tort context to the 
exclusionary rule context in the Fourth Amendment context and, 
increasingly, in the Fifth Amendment context. The trajectory of fault 
as a threshold constraint on suppression remedy evinces several 
commonalities with analogous doctrine in the constitutional tort 
context. First, while initially glossed as a remedy for overdeterrence, 
its applications quickly outpaced that justification. Second, it too has 
leaked into the substance of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, there is 
some threshold circumstantial evidence that judicial interests, rather 
than officials’ interests, better explain the doctrine’s development. 
Unlike the issuance of damages pursuant to § 1983, the exercise 
of judicial power that comprises the exclusionary rule lacks a clear 
statutory foundation. Moreover, since 1974, when the Court 
characterized it as a discretionary mode of Fourth Amendment 
enforcement, its constitutional basis has been at least contestable.139 
For a decade thereafter, the Mapp rule nevertheless endured roughly 
unscathed. Its doctrinal retrenchment began not at a litigant’s behest, 
but at the Court’s. It was the Court that sua sponte ordered 
reargument in 1983 in Illinois v. Gates140 to determine whether Mapp 
should be modified “not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained 
in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”141 Although the Court did 
not reach this issue in Gates, Justice White’s concurrence invoked the 
recently decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald opinion as a guide to narrowing 
 
 139. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary 
rule as a judicially created remedy). 
 140. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 141. Petitioner’s Brief on Reargument at i, Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (No. 81-430), 1983 WL 
482675  (citations omitted). 
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Mapp.142 Beyond touting the benefits of a fault-based safe harbor for 
effective law enforcement, Justice White also drew attention to the 
rule’s payoff to the judiciary in terms of a “reduction in the number of 
cases which will require elongated considerations of the probable 
cause question.”143 Concerns of judicial economy, in short, were in 
plain view even before the fault rule was installed into the structure of 
exclusionary rule jurisprudence. 
A year later, Justice White would write for the Court in United 
States v. Leon144 and fashion a “good-faith” exception for searches in 
reliance upon warrants not supported by probable cause.145 The Leon 
Court once more cited qualified immunity precedent, intimating 
thereby that the exclusionary rule would not apply absent intentional 
or recklessly negligent action.146 Consistent with these citations, Leon 
then deployed the concern with excess deterrence familiar from 
Harlow, asserting that a magistrate who issued a warrant based on an 
erroneous probable-cause determination lacked any “stake in the 
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions” and consequently would 
not be affected by subsequent suppression.147 Completing the circle, 
Justice Stevens would later observe that the Leon standard would in 
turn influence the Court’s approach to the level of specificity at which 
a qualified immunity analysis would be pitched.148 
The Leon exception was at first limited to cases in which the 
issuing magistrate had erred, and an officer had reasonably relied on 
her decision. Subsequent cases extended Leon to cases where police 
officers errantly relied on subsequently invalidated criminal statutes149 
or later-overruled Supreme Court precedent,150 and also where a 
 
 142. Gates, 462 U.S. at 266–67 (White, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 267. 
 144. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 145. Id. at 920–22. 
 146. See id. at 922 & n.23 (stating that “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-
cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be 
objectively reasonable”); see also Laurin, supra note 44, at 703–04 (discussing doctrinal 
migration in Leon). 
 147. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (“Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement 
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”); see 
also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246–47 (2012) (exploring Leon’s deterrence-
based logic). 
 148. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the 
migration of Leon’s “double standard” to the qualified immunity context). 
 149. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987). 
 150. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011). 
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warrant was issued as a result of errors by a court administrator151 or 
an administrator within the police department itself.152 In recent cases, 
the Court has come close to generalizing Leon into a widely 
applicable barrier to suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds 
absent “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” or 
“recurring or systematic negligence.”153 A deterrence-based line of 
reasoning in the context of policing and criminal trials has led the 
Court to roughly the same threshold fault gatekeeping rule as the 
“policy” considerations invoked in the distinct constitutional tort 
context.154 Just as in the tort context,155 moreover, a fault-based 
gatekeeping rule for suppression creates a category of cases in which 
a person has neither an ex ante opportunity to challenge a 
government action, nor any ex post remedy for a constitutional 
violation.156 
 
 151. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995). 
 152. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(stating that “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard 
for Fourth Amendment rights, [then] the deterrent value of exclusion is strong”).  
 153. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. Herring’s formulation was anticipated by Franks v. Delaware, 
which held that criminal defendants could invalidate a warrant based on flaws in the underlying 
affidavits only in cases of “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard of the truth.” Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).  
 154. The analogy between the two lines of cases was anticipated in Richard A. Posner, 
Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 
638–40 (1982), which argues that both exclusion of evidence and officer liability for Fourth 
Amendment violations risk overdeterrence of legitimate law enforcement activity. Although 
this deterrence argument is not the object of my analysis here, it is worth noting a certain 
confusion in the argument Posner offers. Posner’s analysis assumes that there is a social welfare 
function that assigns no particular value to constitutional rights. But it is not clear why this 
should be so. To the contrary, one way of understanding a constitution is as a statement of the 
particular forms of human welfare that are of special concern to the polity. To assign no 
particular weight to constitutional violations, as Posner’s analysis does, is to fail to apply the 
salient social-welfare function for our society. The verbal formulations of the concern differs, 
although the substantive concern is identical: in the tort context, the Court expresses concerns 
about deterring beneficial action; in the exclusionary rule context, the Court finds no need to 
deter unconstitutional actions.  
 155. Cf. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 53 (1989) (noting 
that qualified immunity often leaves “an official’s conduct . . . governed by the subconstitutional 
immunity standard . . . [and] without a clear guide for future conduct”).  
 156. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (noting that “the 
Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is 
available”). As a practical matter, criminal defendants will have no cost-effective damages 
remedy for knock-and-announce violations and many other searches that generate inculpatory 
evidence.  
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One other extension of Leon merits elaboration here. The 
Court’s focus on overdeterrence suggests that its fault gatekeeping 
rule should not be extended to intentional Fourth Amendment 
violations or the substance of Fourth Amendment law. As in the 
constitutional tort context, however, fault has seeped out from the 
domain in which its notional deterrence-related justifications apply to 
domains in which its justification does not obtain. In Hudson v. 
Michigan,157 the Court held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable 
to violations of the “knock-and-announce” rule158 for executing 
warrants on the ground that the interests protected by the knock-and-
announce rule were causally unrelated to the likelihood that evidence 
would be discovered.159 In addition to leaning on the (obviously 
flawed) logic that suppression would fail to create an incentive for 
police to comply with a constitutionally compelled rule, the Hudson 
Court fell back on the assertion that the “increasing professionalism 
of police forces” meant exclusion was no longer necessary.160 The 
force of this argument is hard to discern: even if police are 
professionalized, this does not mean that they will necessarily follow a 
constitutional rule that can by law be violated without consequences. 
To the contrary, as Professor David Sklansky has noted, when 
California amended its state constitution to provide that garbage 
searches were unconstitutional but that no exclusionary rule applied, 
police were “trained to ignore” that constitutional rule, and instead 
conduct illegal garbage searches.161 Professionalism simply increased 
the alacrity with which unconstitutional practices diffused across 
police departments. To assume, as the Hudson Court seems to, that 
professionalism correlates with diminished rates of constitutional 
violation is not obviously justified. 
In 2015, the Court extended the fault rule from the remedies 
context to substantive Fourth Amendment law, tracking the 
remedies-to-substance spillover observed in constitutional tort law.162 
Again, the deterrence rationale for this migration is hard to discern. 
 
 157. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 158. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–32 (1995) (imposing knock-and-announce 
rule for warrant executions). 
 159. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.  
 160. Id. at 598. 
 161. David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 
580–81 & n.70 (2008) (citation omitted).  
 162. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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In Heien v. North Carolina,163 the Court, with a lone dissent from 
Justice Sotomayor, held that a police stop based on an erroneous 
police belief that a criminal law had been broken did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment provided that the officer’s “not . . . perfect” grasp 
of the law was “reasonable.”164 Heien extends Leon’s logic to the 
substance of the Fourth Amendment. Again, Heien’s justification is 
elusive: it is not obvious why police officers charged with executing 
the law should not work under an incentive to become accurately 
informed about it, especially when citizens work under a parallel 
obligation.165 The Court’s own deterrence rationale no longer explains 
(if it ever did) why fault was extended to the Fourth Amendment’s 
suppression remedy. Rather, as with the constitutional tort context, a 
close study of doctrinal development suggests that the Court is the 
principal architect in this fault rule, and that looming large among its 
motives is an institutional concern with judicial economy. 
Once nested in Fourth Amendment law, the fault rule proved 
contagious across remedial boundaries within criminal procedure law. 
Consider the Fifth Amendment prophylactic regime of Miranda v. 
Arizona.166 Early cases applying Miranda eschewed any notion of 
 
 163. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
 164. Id. at 536 (holding that a “reasonable mistake of law” by police did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 165. Mistakes of law occur in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context and are not 
given exculpating significance there. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531–32 
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the petitioner did not invoke his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel when he agreed to speak to police, but not to give a written statement without a 
lawyer present); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424–26 (1986) (finding affirmative police 
misrepresentations about availability of defendant’s lawyer did not undermine waiver of Fifth 
Amendment rights). The Court has also taken a pitiless view of habeas petitioners’ filing errors, 
even when those errors are made in reliance upon a judge’s directions. See Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 207–08 (2007). It is, to be sure, possible to imagine justifications for treating 
officials’ and citizens’ errors asymmetrically. Yet the repeated character of officials’ encounters 
with the law, the distribution of educational and other epistemic resources, and the simple 
possibility of training—with the concomitant risk of moral hazard from judicial exculpation of 
official error—all list against the sort of unilateral mercy that the Court has evinced.  
 166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1966) (discussing the necessity of placing a 
limit on the methods useable by police conducting custodial interrogations). Miranda requires 
the delivery of four warnings and the securing of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights prior to 
custodial interrogation. Id. at 467–76. The failure to give the warnings, however, does not 
necessarily lead to exclusion even absent fault. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449–
51 (1974) (permitting the use of testimony given by third party whose identity was derived from 
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971) 
(allowing the use for impeachment purposes of voluntary statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda). Moreover, it is unclear whether Miranda is constitutionally compelled. When 
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fault.167 A fault rule entered Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in 
litigation over a police tactic that involved violating Miranda by 
failing to give warnings, giving the requisite warnings, and then 
rehearsing the same questions to obtain testimony that had previously 
been aired. In Oregon v. Elstad,168 the Court held that a second 
statement obtained after warnings could be admitted even if it was 
arguably the product of a first unwarned statement.169 Confronted by 
a deliberate strategy of using unwarned questioning to inform 
Mirandized interrogation in Missouri v. Seibert,170 however, the Court 
fragmented, with a plurality adopting an approach that purported to 
focus solely on the efficacy of any warning eventually delivered.171 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, focused on the intentional 
quality of the Miranda violation, importing a notion of fault (albeit 
not the unreasonable fault that characterizes other remedial 
domains).172 Subsequently, several lower courts have looked to 
officers’ intentions to analyze Miranda violations in the two-stage 
interrogation context.173 Hence, the operative Fifth Amendment 
remedial rule in Seibert’s wake increasingly tracks the fault-based 
logic of Leon and its progeny in sorting for deliberate constitutional 
violations and disregarding negligent violations. Fault’s seemingly 
inexorable spread as a threshold trigger for suppression remedies 
confirms its ascendance as a regulative principle for individualized 
constitutional remedies in general. 
D. Fault in Postconviction Habeas Jurisprudence 
The third remedial domain in which fault has come to play a 
pivotal rationing function is postconviction habeas review. Since 1867, 
the postconviction writ has provided a procedural vehicle for state 
 
presented with the question whether Miranda violations can be enforced via constitutional tort 
suits, the Court fragmented. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).  
 167. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1988). 
 168. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 169. Id. at 306–10. 
 170. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2000). 
 171. Id. at 604–06 (plurality opinion) (Souter, J.). 
 172. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to resolve the issue because the statement would be suppressed under any applicable 
framework); United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting the officer acted in 
good faith, and discussing the plurality’s test); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (stating that “at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations,” there is a 
“presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test”). 
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and federal prisoners to challenge their confinement on the ground 
that there was a constitutional error in their initial criminal 
adjudication.174 The present law of postconviction review is 
labyrinthine.175 I focus here on advancing three relatively limited 
claims. First, a fault rule plays the same gatekeeping function in the 
habeas context as it does in the constitutional tort and the 
exclusionary rule domains. Second, even though postconviction 
habeas is necessarily a statutory creation, it has been the Court that 
has taken the laboring oar by endowing fault with a regulative 
function. Tracking the etiology of the fault rule in the constitutional 
tort context, the parallel habeas rule has evolved incrementally 
through a process of common-law adjudication. And third, this 
regulative function is best explained in terms of judicial-economy 
concerns.176 
From its inception, the midcentury reinvigoration of collateral 
relief from state criminal convictions attracted fierce criticism for its 
psychological and practical toll upon state criminal justice systems.177 
It was not, however, until 1989 that the Court in Teague v. Lane178 
began to carve out a safe harbor for state officials who complied with 
contemporaneously applicable constitutional rules—and 
correspondingly began to deny relief to litigants who failed to identify 
an especially glaring constitutional error.179 Formally a rule about 
retroactivity, Teague in fact tracked the early versions of fault found 
in cases such as Pierson v. Ray180 and Arizona v. Evans.181 By holding 
 
 174. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86. For a comprehensive 
history of postconviction review, see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2331, 2350–76 (1993). 
 175. I have offered a synthesis in Huq, supra note 9, at 531–53.  
 176. For an earlier account of the primacy of judicial preferences over the shape of habeas, 
see id. at 523; see also John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 259, 262 (2006) (“While the Court maintains that the scope of the writ is primarily for 
Congress to determine, it does not, in my view, really believe that to be true . . . . [It] has 
assumed a fair share of the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or how 
much habeas is enough.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963) (arguing that finality is a critical element of the 
criminal justice system which is undermined by procedural elements which permit extensive 
collateral challenges to final sentencing). 
 178. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 179. Id. at 301. 
 180. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967). See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying 
text. 
 181. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995). See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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that habeas petitioners could not obtain relief based on violations of 
constitutional rules announced after their convictions became final,182 
it held state officials responsible for extant constitutional law, but not 
potential expansions. That Teague was inspired by the logic of 
qualified immunity was immediately apparent to sophisticated 
observers, even if not explicit in the decision.183 Just how far the Court 
would take the analogy would take time to surface. 
The next doctrinal move toward a fault rule in habeas came a 
year later. The Court held that state-court convictions would be 
assessed for Teague novelty against a specific and granular version of 
the precedent, not the general principle of constitutional law 
embodied by the case.184 This development paralleled the demand for 
specificity in constitutional tort law.185 As in the constitutional tort 
context, the demand that habeas petitioners identify a specific rule 
extant at the time their convictions became final meant that “any 
decision, reasonably distinguishable on its facts from prior decisions,” 
could be ranked as an unenforceable new rule, especially as the mere 
fact of “actual disagreement among courts” counted as evidence of 
reasonable disagreement.186 
Here, the evolution of fault in postconviction review diverges 
from its trajectory in the constitutional tort and exclusionary rule 
contexts: unique to the habeas context is a measure of congressional 
involvement in the form of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).187 AEDPA imposed a suite of new 
constraints on postconviction petitions, including a new statute of 
limitation, more stringent rules against seriatim petitions, and a more 
 
 182. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and 
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425 (1994) (characterizing and criticizing Teague’s holding 
that “convictions should not be overturned on the basis of constitutional violations that state 
courts could not have known of, let alone avoided, at the time a case was tried”). 
 183. See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (1991) (drawing this comparison). 
 184. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409, 414–15 (1990). It is indicative of conscious 
borrowing of doctrinal innovations from other remedial domains that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Butler opinion cites Leon with approval. Id. at 414. The convergence of qualified immunity and 
habeas doctrine is noted in Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 635–
40 (1993). 
 185. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 186. Meyer, supra note 182, at 442; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 183, at 1761 (citing 
Butler as an example of the “starkly positivist view” that “when consensus dissolves . . . judicial 
formulation of new law is rather unconstrained”). 
 187. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
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onerous standard of review.188 But in terms of its key fault rule, 
AEDPA was largely anticipated by judicial developments, and the 
effect of AEDPA has proved to be largely a function of judicial 
glosses—interpretations that have altered dramatically over time 
absent any congressional updating.189 The semblance of congressional 
control, in short, is largely illusory: calibration of the fault rule in 
habeas jurisprudence has, in significant measure, fallen within judicial 
discretion. 
The primacy of judicial policy discretion in fault’s emergence can 
be perceived by placing AEPDA in a larger context. Prior to 
AEDPA, Teague deference to state-court determinations applied 
solely to pure questions of law, not the mixed questions of law and 
fact that dominate in habeas practice.190 Asked to extend Teague 
deference prior to AEDPA in 1992, the Court splintered in Wright v 
West,191 with Justice Thomas’s opinion pressing toward an expansion 
of Teague securing only two other votes.192 What the Court could not 
muster a majority to install by common-law adjudication, Congress 
was able to push through in the heated aftermath to a major domestic 
terrorism incident.193 Four years after West, Congress included in 
AEDPA stringent standards of review for legal and factual error of 
state-court convictions.194 Assuming the state court reached the 
merits, AEDPA directed that its decision could be adjudged on the 
merits only if “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
 
 188. See Blume, supra note 176, at 270–74 (summarizing AEDPA’s core provisions). 
 189. Huq, supra note 9, at 530–32, 531 n.42.  
 190. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (stating that mixed questions of fact and 
law are “subject to plenary federal review” on habeas); accord Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 
289, 294 (1992) (noting validity of Miller after Teague). 
 191. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992). 
 192. Id. at 294 (suggesting, without holding, that deference should be extended to mixed 
questions of fact and law). 
 193. Notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s failure to forge a majority in West, subsequent 
majority opinions echoed his language, rather than the more generous terms of the West 
concurrences. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (“[W]e will not disturb a 
final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state court, at the time the 
conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively unreasonably by not 
extending the relief later sought in federal court.”); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) 
(stating that federal habeas relief is appropriate only if “reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s 
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to 
rule in his favor” (citation omitted)). 
 194. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (2012)). 
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Court of the United States.”195 Like qualified immunity, this is a 
gatekeeping rule. Habeas petitioners who surmount that hurdle still 
have to establish an independent entitlement to constitutional relief.196 
As enacted, AEDPA’s core gatekeeping rule, codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), merely accomplished what Justice Thomas 
exhorted in West. It extinguished most de novo review in federal 
habeas consideration of state criminal convictions in favor of a fault-
based standard akin to the demand for evidence of an unambiguously 
unconstitutional action in constitutional tort law.197 That fault rule, 
moreover, applied to not just questions of law but also mixed 
questions of law and fact. As a legislative enactment, AEDPA thus 
mimicked previously expressed judicial preferences. 
But the fault rule of § 2254(d)(1) did not remain fixed. 
Notwithstanding the absence of formal statutory changes, the Court 
has incrementally altered its interpretation of that provision to the 
point where relief is available only when a state-court violation of 
constitutional rights is, in effect, grossly negligent or intentional. This 
process of common-law adjudication has over time aligned the fault 
rule for habeas with the fault rule for postconviction relief and for 
suppression remedies. This process of shifting legal meaning in the 
absence of statutory change suggests again that the relative strength 
of the fault rule even under AEDPA has been a function of judicial 
preference rather than the plain meaning of the statutory text. 
Section 2254(d)(1) was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
the 2000 case of Williams v. Taylor198 to permit merits consideration of 
a habeas petitioner’s claim only when “the state court arrives at a 
conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law 
or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a 
set of materially indistinguishable facts,” or alternatively, when the 
state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this 
Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts 
 
 195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Factual errors are cognizable only if “unreasonable.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2). The latter provision, however, interacts with other elements of AEPDA in ways 
that have not yet been fully resolved. See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010) (noting a 
circuit conflict about how the reasonableness rule in § 2254(d)(2) interacts with the presumption 
in favor of state court factual conclusions in § 2254(e)(1), but declining to resolve it). 
 196. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
 197. James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas 
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2015–16 (1992) (noting that de novo 
review on habeas was the central target of Justice Thomas’s critique). 
 198. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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of the prisoner’s case.”199 While this standard might sound demanding, 
the Williams plurality expressly rejected an even harsher circuit court 
gloss on § 2254(d)(1) to the effect that “a state-court judgment is 
‘unreasonable’ (and hence invalid) only if all reasonable jurists would 
agree that the state court was unreasonable, and granted habeas 
relief.”200 
Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Court recalibrated the 
meaning of AEDPA deference, and adopted that lower-court 
standard, despite Congress’s failure to amend § 2254(d)(1).201 By 2011, 
Justice Kennedy could say on behalf of a supermajority of the Court 
that habeas relief was warranted for legal error under AEDPA only if 
“there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state 
court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.”202 Subsequent 
to that reformulation of the § 2254(d)(1) standard, the Court further 
narrowed the availability of review by holding that the “clearly 
established” federal law relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry 
encompassed only decisions handed down when the state court ruled, 
rather than when that ruling became final.203 Important to my 
argument here, this decision was unanimous: the fault rule is 
uncontroversial across ideological lines in the habeas context, just as 
it is uncontroversial in the constitutional tort and (sometimes) in the 
exclusionary rule context. Accordingly, there is a wide consensus 
within the Court that habeas relief should be available now only 
where a petitioner can demonstrate “the exceptional 
blameworthiness of the state”204—a state of affairs that parallels 
developments in the constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule 
contexts. 
In sum, the present crystallization of the fault rule in 
postconviction habeas is a function of judicial rather than 
congressional preferences. As early as 1953, Justice Jackson worried 
 
 199. Id. at 412–13 (2000).  
 200. Id. at 377 (emphasis added) (discussing the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) applied in 
Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 201. For a detailed account of this process, see Huq, supra note 9, at 536–41. 
 202. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (8-0 decision). The court in Harrington 
further stated that only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system” warrant 
relief. Id. (citation omitted). Although Harrington was not unanimous, it has been cited 
approvingly in subsequent unanimous opinions. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 
1992 (2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013). 
 203. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011). 
 204. Huq, supra note 9, at 581. 
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about the demoralizing effect of a “flood” of habeas cases.205 His 
worry did not abate over time. To the contrary, the volume of habeas 
petitions increased by more than one third between the mid-1970s 
and the late 1989 Teague rule.206 The year that Teague was decided, 
Justice Kennedy (albeit writing in dissent) warned against decisions 
that “increase prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal 
courts.”207 During the 1980s both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Powell frequently spoke out about the costs of habeas in terms of 
delay, especially in the capital context.208 Simultaneously, 
administration officials such as the Attorney General decried “the 
flood of habeas corpus petitions engulfing our federal courts.”209 The 
story recounted here—in which a fault rule is adopted at the Court’s 
urging and then gradually rendered more onerous through common-
law recalibration—is one that is most easily explained, at least in 
substantial part, by the institutional interests of the judiciary. 
II.  THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN REMEDIAL RATIONING AND 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
This Part advances the causal claim that fault, as a regulative 
principle for rationing scarce judicial resources, finds at least some 
causal foundation in the institutional independence of the federal 
judiciary above and beyond the ideological and policy-focused 
concerns that immediately spring to mind. I develop four arguments 
 
 205. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It must prejudice 
the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must 
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth 
the search.”). 
 206. BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE 
DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 135 (2013) (presenting data on state 
postconviction filings between 1941 and 2010). 
 207. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Marin Levy has 
demonstrated that the Court has maintained an inconsistent view toward floodgates arguments 
in the habeas context, sometimes accepting them and sometimes repudiating them as 
inconsistent with the statutory text. Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1007, 1043–49 (2013). Levy’s focus, however, is on the kind of arguments the Court 
deploys, and not the effects of doctrine on caseload volumes. My aim is to explain the evolving 
contours of doctrine, and for that purpose rhetoric is not necessarily probative.  
 208. Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital 
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 723–25 (2002). 
 209. Ira P. Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme 
Court’s 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 266–67 (1987) (footnote omitted). Rhetorical invocation of a 
“flood” of habeas petitions dates back at least to Professor Bator’s landmark article. See Bator, 
supra note 177, at 506.  
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for the conclusion that judicial independence—understood as the 
federal judiciary’s autonomy, not a characteristic of any individual 
judge—has played a role in catalyzing the fault-based rationing of 
constitutional remedies. First, building on evidence presented in Part 
I, I repudiate arguments for attributing fault’s contours to Congress 
or the strategic behavior of litigants. Second, I suggest reasons for 
concluding that the doctrinal developments described in Part I were 
not motivated wholly by ideological change. These two lines of 
arguments clear space for alternative explanations focused on 
institutional interests. The third argument I develop is a historical 
account of those institutional interests that adds context and 
affirmative circumstantial evidence for attributing the fault rule to 
judicial independence. Finally, I present a powerful piece of 
circumstantial evidence: the fault rule does not encompass all forms 
of constitutional remediation, and its scope is better explained by 
institutional, rather than ideological, interests. 
A. Fault as a Judicial or a Congressional Rule 
The first piece of evidence linking the gatekeeping fault rule for 
individual constitutional remedies to the institutional interests of the 
federal judiciary is the origin of that rule: as Part I suggested, it is 
impossible to attribute the fault rule’s emergence to legislative 
initiative. To the contrary, it has emerged from the judiciary via 
common-law adjudication, with only occasional support from the 
legislative branch of the federal government. Further, this fault rule 
cannot be ascribed merely to the different incentives and resources of 
litigants. 
1. Fault as a Legislative Imposition?  One implication of the 
analysis offered in Part I is that Congress, notwithstanding its 
formally plenary control of federal courts’ jurisdiction,210 plays little 
direct role in crafting constitutional remedies.211 That analysis shows 
that at least in the individual remedies domain, Congress’s influence 
 
 210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”).  
 211. This is not to say that legislators do not play an indirect role. Docket pressures in 
statutory cases for example influence not only adjudicative procedures, but also substantive 
outcomes. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011) (finding that 
“when flooded by the [administrative] agency cases, . . . circuit courts began to reverse district 
court rulings less often—in the civil cases”). 
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is notable mainly by its absence. This is true in regard to both the 
creation and the evisceration of remedies. To be sure, Congress was 
responsible for enacting both a civil-damages remedy against states 
for constitutional violations in 1871 and a postconviction habeas writ 
in 1867.212 But both remedies lay dormant for three-quarters of a 
century before being revived by the Court. And, as Part I 
demonstrated at length, the subsequent contraction of habeas review, 
the exclusionary rule, and constitutional tort actions have also largely 
been the work of the courts rather than Congress.213 This is most 
obviously so with qualified immunity, a doctrine unembarrassed by 
any purchase in statutory text, but openly motivated by the Court’s 
own “considerations of public policy” since the 1970s.214 That doctrine 
“represent[s] a remarkable exercise of judicial creativity,” not an 
exemplar of legislative control.215 
This is not to say Congress plays no role at all. In some respects, 
Congress has seconded the Court’s campaign to constrain individual 
constitutional remedies. But its main interventions, AEPDA and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act216 were enacted in 1996—many years 
after the main elements of the fault-based regime described in Part I 
were already in place.217 As Part I.D. explored at length, AEDPA’s 
role in catalyzing the fault rule in habeas is overstated: that rule, now 
embodied in § 2254(d)(1), was anticipated by Justice Thomas four 
years before AEDPA’s enactment, and the writ’s effectiveness has 
fluctuated over time as the Court’s view of it has grown increasingly 
minatory. To understand AEDPA’s installation of fault in 
§ 2254(d)(1) as a de facto delegation to the Court, which would then 
independently calibrate that rule, is, moreover, consistent with a 
legislative history that is ambiguous, conflicted, and far less amenable 
 
 212. See supra Part I.A. 
 213. See supra Part I.A. 
 214. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07 (1978); see supra Part I.B.1.  
 215. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional 
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2010). 
 216. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–66 
(1996). 
 217. This is not to say that these measures did not meaningfully supplement previous 
judicial efforts at rationing. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, for example, was “highly 
successful in reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three percent decline over five years.” Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1694 (2003). 
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to unilaterally statist readings than the Court has sometimes 
suggested.218 
In other respects, Congress has either been rebuffed or taken a 
more lenient view of constitutional plaintiffs than the Court. On the 
one hand, on some occasions, Congress intervenes, seemingly to 
promote a trend a majority of the Court has already endorsed, and its 
intrusion is deemed by the Justices to be an insult to judicial 
suzerainty over constitutional interpretation. Justices, not legislators, 
therefore have the last word for all practical purposes over the 
remedial dispensation. In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, for 
example, Congress directed that a statement made by a defendant in 
custody “shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”219 In 
Dickerson v. United States,220 however, the Court notoriously held that 
Congress could not supersede Miranda because the latter had 
announced a “constitutional rule,”221 a ruling that rested upon “a 
strong statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation” rather than a shared hermeneutic responsibility.222 
On yet other occasions, Congress has been more solicitous of 
plaintiffs seeking constitutional remedies than the Court. For 
example, rather than narrowing Bivens, Congress has taken care to 
preserve that remedy when regulating government tort liability via 
the Westfall Act.223 The Westfall Act virtually immunizes federal 
government officials from state common-law tort liability, substituting 
the government as a defendant upon the issuance of a certification by 
the Attorney General. Congress, however, expressly declared the 
exclusivity rule inapplicable to suits brought against government 
officials “for a violation of the Constitution of the United States,”224 a 
category that most obviously reaches Bivens actions. In short, even in 
limiting governmental liability, Congress was careful to preserve 
 
 218. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
443, 445 (2007) (“Given what we know about AEDPA’s legislative history, there is little support 
for the argument that courts should interpret AEDPA’s ambiguities with any particular 
purposes in mind.”). 
 219. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 3501(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501(a) (2012)). 
 220. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 221. Id. at 460. 
 222. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 61, 62. 
 223. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall 
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563. 
 224. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
HUQ IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/2015  11:46 AM 
44 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1 
individual-officer suits created by the Court. This is in striking 
contrast to the Court’s hostility to Bivens actions.225 
A possible rejoinder to this line of argument might posit that the 
Court operates in the shadow of legislative correction.226 On this view, 
it is impossible in the absence of a constitutional ruling to attribute 
doctrinal change to judicial preferences given the omnipresent 
possibility of legislative correction. As a theoretical matter, this view 
fails to account for the nature of legislation produced by a bicameral 
legislative system attended by a presidential veto. A now canonical 
body of work in political science demonstrates that in any political 
system with “many veto players separated by large ideological 
distance . . . legislation can only be incremental.”227 Moreover, as the 
complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specification 
rise, legislators will tend more and more to delegate decisions rather 
than resolve hard questions themselves.228 As a result, “[t]he 
constitutional process for enacting legislation, which requires all 
legislative proposals to pass through two chambers of Congress and 
be presented to the President (or, in the event of a presidential veto, 
to survive supermajority votes in the House and Senate), provides 
considerable protection for federal jurisdiction.”229 
As an empirical matter, the argument from legislative dominance 
grossly overstates the efficacy of congressional control.230 As Professor 
Tara Grove has documented, “[t]he history of federal jurisdiction 
from the late nineteenth century to the present day demonstrates that 
the lawmaking procedures of Article I have repeatedly safeguarded 
the federal judiciary.”231 Widening the lens, empirical work by 
Professor William Eskridge and others shows the probability of 
 
 225. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 45, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a 
good deal more circumspect” in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts). 
 226. I have not been able to locate any published work taking this position, but the 
argument has been pressed upon me in correspondence and conversations with much eloquence 
and force by Mike Seidman.  
 227. George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An 
Empirical Analysis, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591, 605 (1999). Tsebelis is describing parliamentary 
systems, but the point applies here.  
 228. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999).  
 229. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 871 (2011). 
 230. For an empirical test that finds little evidence that the Court anticipates legislative 
correction, see Ryan J. Owens, The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 419–24 (2010). 
 231. Grove, supra note 229, at 916. 
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congressional override to be diminishing over time, with successful 
legislation characterized by bipartisan efforts at updating regulatory 
policy, rather than controversial and divisive “corrections” of 
Supreme Court errors.232 There is little cause for a policy-minded 
Court, that is, to anticipate legislative intervention by trimming its 
sails. 
2. Fault as an Outcome of Litigant Incentives?  If legislative 
incentives do not predict or explain the use of fault to ration 
constitutional remedies, is there some other factor exogenous to the 
federal courts that might do explanatory work? More than forty years 
ago, Professor Marc Galanter pointed out that “[r]epeat play” 
litigants, who are able to identify relatively technical issues upon 
which liability turns, will, all else being equal, prevail more frequently 
than one-shot claimants.233 Consistent with this insight, the Solicitor 
General acting on behalf of the United States enjoys an unusual 
success rates in the Court.234 That office is perhaps uniquely situated 
to stymie effective channels of constitutional redress. Can the fault 
rule then be attributed to the ability of government litigants to 
coordinate with low transaction costs, to select favorable test cases for 
certiorari review, and to persist where individual litigants might sag? 
The short answer is no. Litigant resources cannot explain the 
emergence and migration of fault that was described in Part I for a 
number of reasons. First, it is easy to overstate the government’s 
success rate (especially of late),235 and to forget that there are 
 
 232. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (finding that 
after the 1990s, “overrides declined as dramatically as they had ascended”). Further, “override 
statutes frequently supported by bipartisan majorities in Congress [] have as their stated goal 
the updating of public law, rather than ‘correction’ of judicial mistakes.” Id. at 1320. It is very 
unlikely that the Justices imposing the fault rule did so because they anticipated a bipartisan 
majority in both Houses that would overrule them otherwise. For an even more pessimistic view 
of Congress’s power to override judicial decisions, see Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? 
Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 217 (2013). 
 233. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (drawing the distinction). 
 234. For example, approximately seventy percent of the cases recommended for a certiorari 
grant by the Solicitor General are reviewed by the Court. See, e.g., Adam D. Chandler, The 
Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725, 
728 (2011). 
 235. See Charles Hurt, The Supreme Court’s Biggest Loser: Barack Obama, WASH. TIMES 
(July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/1/the-supreme-courts-biggest-
loser-barack-obama/ [http://perma.cc/H73T-Q6AJ] (arguing that the Obama administration in 
2014 suffered an unusual string of high-profile losses).  
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organized interest groups on the other side of many constitutional-
rights issues, ranging from property-rights advocates to organizations 
promoting the interests of discrete and insular racial and ethnic 
groups. Second, many of the pivotal changes to the doctrine have 
been effected sua sponte by the federal courts, rather than flowing 
from prolonged litigation campaigns by organized government 
interests. Recall for example that the catalyst for the first iteration of 
a “good faith” rule in the exclusionary rule context was the Court’s 
decision to add a question to a certiorari petition presenting a Fourth 
Amendment issue.236 In the habeas context, the Court initially 
rejected the narrowest reading of § 2254(d)(1), and then of its own 
initiative tightened up that standard in a series of cases in which no 
party demanded such increased scrutiny.237 
In short, reliance on congressional preferences or litigant 
asymmetries is not persuasive as a theoretical matter or as a matter of 
fit with the observed processes of doctrinal change. The gatekeeping 
rule for constitutional remedies is better understood as a function of 
judicial preferences. 
B. Judicial Ideology as a Cause of Remedial Rationing 
A considerable body of scholarship identifies the ideological 
roots of changes to constitutional doctrine in the late 1970s and 1980s 
as the Warren Court gave way to the Burger and the Rehnquist 
Courts.238 In light of that scholarship, the development of fault might 
be explained in simple ideological terms: the Court became more 
conservative as President Nixon and other Republicans made more 
appointments.239 It was also aware of, and sensitive to, changes in the 
crime rate in that period—changes that confirmed the worries of new 
conservative appointees.240 And perhaps—most cynically and 
 
 236. See Petitioner’s Brief on Reargument at i, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (No. 81-
430), 1983 WL 482675 (citations omitted). 
 237. Huq, supra note 9, at 540 (explaining that recent changes to the interpretation of 
§ 2254(d)(1) were not made at the behest of the parties). 
 238. See, e.g., supra note 20 and sources cited therein. 
 239. JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON 
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2001) (recounting then–
presidential advisor William Rehnquist’s advice to President Reagan to appoint “strict 
constructionists” to the federal courts, who “will generally not be favorably inclined toward 
claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights plaintiffs”). 
 240. See Arenella, supra note 20, at 187. But see Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It 
Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and 
Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT 
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crassly—one might suppose that some of the new Justices were less 
than sympathetic to certain minority populations’ constitutional 
claims.241 Given the overlapping influences of ideology, concerns 
about crime control, and racialized politics, it might be thought that 
there is no room for an account focused on the institutional interests 
of the Supreme Court. Making a place for institutional interests, 
therefore, requires some response to reductive accounts of doctrinal 
change. 
My aim in this section is to demonstrate that whatever role 
ideology—whether subtly or crassly defined—played, it cannot 
explain wholesale the development of the fault rule. That is, I do not 
doubt that the changing composition of the Court over the 1970s and 
1980s influenced the development of the case law. I do doubt that 
ideology, or the politics of crime and race, is the whole story.242 The 
primary evidence for my claim to this effect is simple: key precedent 
in all three lines of cases is surprisingly bereft of sharp ideological 
division. In particular, qualified immunity and habeas precedent 
include frequent supermajoritarian and even unanimous opinions. 
Dissent rates also seem to diminish with a speed and alacrity that 
appointment-driven change cannot adequately explain. Hence, the 
distribution of votes on the Court is hard to square with purely 
ideological accounts. I first work through this evidence, and then 
adduce a series of supplemental reasons for resisting crassly 
ideological accounts. 
1. Qualified Immunity.  Consider first qualified immunity. The 
fons et origo of much modern qualified immunity doctrine is Pierson 
v. Ray, an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren from which only 
Justice Douglas dissented.243 Butz v. Economou,244 which intimated the 
 
WASN’T 62, 62–63, 90–91 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting that the distinctions between the 
Warren and Burger Courts were based more on fear of what might happen than on the more 
moderate changes the Burger Court actually made). 
 241. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March 
and the Speech: History, Memory, Values, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 17, 56 (2015) (“The [Reagan-
era] concern with ‘criminal defendants’ reflected the new rhetoric of non-racial categories that 
nonetheless carried racial significance for many Americans.”). 
 242. One problem with these ideological accounts of the Court’s conservative turn is their 
general failure to recognize the historical depth of political polarization over crime, and the 
complex etiology of harsh penal policy. See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND 
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing this 
point). 
 243. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 244. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
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functional basis for qualified immunity and extended that immunity 
to federal officials, attracted dissents only from Justices who would 
have applied absolute immunity.245 The Court’s full bore adoption of a 
functionalist logic in Harlow v. Fitzgerald similarly attracted only the 
lone protest of Chief Justice Burger, from a statist, pro-defendant 
perspective.246 The creation of absolute immunity for prosecutors in 
Imbler v. Pachtman,247 once more, elicited only a concurrence from 
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall that largely approved of “the 
judgment of the Court and . . . much of its reasoning.”248 Today, the 
majority of applications of qualified immunity elicit not just a 
majority, but unanimity, from the Court.249 For example, Justice 
Scalia’s 2011 statement that qualified immunity shelters “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” elicited 
no protests from the liberal wing of the Court, despite its distance 
from the qualified immunity doctrine of even the Burger Court.250 
Qualified immunity—notwithstanding its potentially significant 
normative and distributive effects—is thus beyond debate for the 
current Court. 
There have been instances, to be sure, in which liberal Justices 
resisted the increasing calcification of constitutional tort law via 
qualified immunity, but this resistance was to prove short lived. In 
Anderson v. Creighton,251 for example, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and 
Marshall criticized “the Court’s (literally unwarranted) extension of 
qualified immunity,” noting that the Fourth Amendment’s rule of 
probable cause already provided officers with ample breathing 
room.252 By 2014, however, Anderson had become sufficiently 
routinized that liberal Justices not only joined opinions that cited its 
 
 245. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist 
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens. Id. 
 246. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 822 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 247. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 
 248. Id. at 432 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). 
 249. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (unanimous); Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223 (2009) (unanimous). 
 250. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 2085–90 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475 
U.S. 335, 341 (1985)). Justice Ginsburg, along with Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, concurred 
only in the judgment, but did not object to this formulation of qualified immunity. Id. at 2087 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 251. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 252. Id. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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rule, but agreed to per curiam reversals on its basis.253 And where the 
application of the demanding Anderson rule elicits dissents, it is a 
supermajority of Justices that includes both liberals and conservatives 
to be found insisting on a harsh application of that rule.254 In short, 
there is little reason to gloss the emergence of qualified immunity as a 
doctrinal change associated with the conservative, pro-law-and-order 
wing of the Court. Rather, that doctrine has long had substantial 
cross-ideological support—support that has only deepened over time. 
Qualified immunity doctrine yields one further item of evidence 
that suggests the role of institutional, rather than ideological, 
concerns in shaping the law. In 2001, the Court held in Saucier v. 
Katz255 that courts engaged in a qualified immunity analysis had to 
follow a certain sequence of analysis starting with a mandatory 
“initial inquiry” into whether a constitutional rule had been violated 
before any determination of clearly established law.256 Writing for the 
Court in Saucier, Justice Kennedy explained that this analytic 
sequence would facilitate “the process for the law’s elaboration from 
case to case”257 and hence ensure expeditious development of clearly 
established rules to serve as a predicate for constitutional tort 
liability. Yet eight years later, the Court in Pearson v. Callahan258 
unanimously abandoned the Saucier sequencing rule in favor of a rule 
that allowed lower courts to forego the “initial inquiry” into the law 
in favor of a ruling on whether a “clearly established” rule had been 
violated.259 Because this reversal has the effect of decelerating the rate 
at which constitutional rules become clearly established, it not only 
increases the chances that a plaintiff subject to Pearson rule will lose, 
but also diminishes the chances that many other future plaintiffs will 
lose for want of a clearly established rule. 
Pearson is telling not merely because it was unanimous, but 
because it was liberal Justices, led by Justice Breyer, who launched 
 
 253. See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Anderson); 
see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam) (relying on Anderson, albeit 
not so centrally, in the course of a summary reversal). 
 254. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (relying on Anderson to 
dismiss Fourth Amendment claim); id. at 1251 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. (Kagan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1252 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.). 
 255. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 256. Id. at 201. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 259. Id. at 234. 
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the call for Saucier’s reconsideration—and did so on the basis of 
institutional consideration. In 2004, Justice Breyer criticized Saucier 
on the ground that “when courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order 
of battle’ makes little administrative sense.”260 In 2007, he reiterated 
his concern that the rule was “wasting judicial resources.”261 That is, it 
was a liberal Justice who pressed first and most urgently for enlarged 
application of qualified immunity’s fault rule in a way that 
predictability would conduce to less clearly established law and fewer 
constitutional tort recoveries. He did so expressly out of institutional 
concerns related to his conception of the federal judiciary’s sound 
operation. Qualified immunity doctrine, in short, embodies powerful 
evidence that ideological considerations do not exhaust the causal 
forces motivating the rise and currently hegemonic status of fault-
based gatekeeping rules. 
2. Postconviction Review.  A similar tale of ideological 
convergence can be told in respect to habeas jurisprudence. At least 
in the last decade or so, ideological conflict over habeas—as opposed 
to over the death penalty—a distinct matter often entangled in habeas 
cases—has almost wholly abated. Liberal and conservative Justices 
alike praise and enforce a fault-based regime. It is certainly true that 
early cases installing fault-based gatekeeping rules elicited dissents. 
For example, the Court’s 2000 ruling on the meaning of § 2254(d)(1)’s 
gatekeeping rule was highly fractured.262 Even then, it is worth 
emphasizing the supermajority quality of many opinions. The pivotal 
decision of Wainwright v. Sykes,263 which installed one of the first 
fault-based rules for habeas, was 7–2, with only Justices Brennan and 
Marshall dissenting.264 
Yet ideological division has proved remarkably evanescent. Even 
as the Court has ratcheted up the intensity of the fault threshold for 
habeas, the Court has coalesced into a united front in demanding that 
 
 260. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Lower courts 
echoed this concern. See Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (complaining that Saucier forced decisions on “difficult and fact-intensive 
question[s]”). 
 261. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 430 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“I believe that in order to lift the burden from lower courts we can and should 
reconsider Saucier’s requirement . . . .”). 
 262. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367, 399 (2000). 
 263. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 264. Id. at 99 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).  
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habeas petitioners satisfy Harrington v. Richter’s265 more onerous and 
demanding version of the statutory fault rule266 that was rejected in 
2000 by the Court at a time when it had more Republican appointees.267 
Nor is Harrington an outlier:268 there is a remarkable series of 
decisions in which a unanimous Court, often acting per curiam, has 
reversed habeas decisions without briefing or oral argument based on 
the petitioner’s failure to show sufficient fault.269 These cases show 
that the fault rule is so uncontroversial among all the Justices, 
whether liberal or conservative, that they are willing to jettison their 
ordinary rule against error correction.270 The trajectory of habeas 
jurisprudence, in short, speaks to the strength of institutional, as 
opposed to ideological, motives as a causal force.271 
3. The Exclusionary Rule.  Finally, consider the exclusionary rule. 
A fault rule for suppression remedies was justified first in judicial-
economy terms, not in overdeterrence terms. Hence, in a pre-Leon 
concurrence, Justice White argued that a fault-based limitation on 
suppression remedies would yield a “reduction in the number of cases 
which will require elongated considerations of the probable-cause 
question.”272 Nevertheless, the evidence of ideological polarization 
over the exclusionary rule is weaker than in qualified immunity and 
habeas contexts. But it is not absent. Whereas early cases such as 
 
 265. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
 266. See id. at 786; supra text accompanying note 202. Harrington was applied by a 
unanimous Court without dissent in Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013). It was 
unanimously extended in Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011), which held that the “clearly 
established” federal law relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions 
handed down when the state court ruled, rather than when that ruling became final. 
 267. Huq, supra note 9, at 581 (developing this comparison). Between 2000 and 2014, 
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Stevens, and Souter (all Republican appointees) resigned, while 
Justices Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan (two Republican and two Democrat) were 
confirmed.  
 268. In the same Term as Harrington, a supermajority of the Court also dramatically limited 
the availability of evidentiary hearings in habeas. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400–
01 (2011) (7-2 decision); Huq, supra note 9, at 536–37 (explaining the impact of Pinholster). 
 269. See, e.g., Ryan v. Schad, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013) (per curiam); Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. 
Ct. 1990 (2013) (per curiam); Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) (per curiam); Johnson 
v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013); Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012) (per curiam); Greene 
v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011). 
 270. See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 271. For an extended argument to this effect, see Huq, supra note 9, at 586–93. 
 272. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 267 (1983) (White, J., concurring). 
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Leon attracted multiple dissents,273 more recent opinions, such as 
Arizona v. Evans, have attracted smaller dissents.274 And the Court’s 
most recent extension of Leon in Heien v. North Carolina accrued 
only a single protest vote.275 
In short, careful examination of the case law does not support 
the conclusion that fault-based remedial rationing is a consequence of 
ideological change alone. Although ideology has certainly been 
salient, it does not capture the whole story: Justices repeatedly 
emphasize caseload and judicial-economy concerns in regard to 
habeas, suppression remedies, and constitutional tort. And the 
coalitions observed in the jurisprudence belie any simple ideological 
account. Consistent with this ideological variation, not all of the 
doctrines canvassed above concern constitutional challenges typically 
favored by liberal Justices and disfavored by conservative Justices. 
Challenges to state taxes, for example, lack any obvious ideological 
valence and yet are hedged by a species of the fault rule.276 A Bivens 
claim subject to qualified immunity is available just as much to a 
rancher infuriated by meddling federal land officials as a racial 
minority subject to harassing and intrusive federal policing.277 To boil 
the case law down to ideology, in short, is to fail to take seriously the 
Court qua court, to ignore the statements of the Justices, and to blink 
to observed patterns of judicial coalition-formation. It is to impose a 
crude functionalism on a Court that, in practice, is much more supple 
in its thinking. 
C. Circumstantial Evidence of the Institutional Roots of the 
Fault Rule 
To claim that courts, rather than legislators or litigants, have 
been responsible for the ascendency of fault is to assert that federal 
judges have had both institutional means and sufficient motives to 
install the regime described in Part I. There is considerable historical 
and contemporaneous empirical evidence of both means and motive. 
 
 273. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by 
Marshall, J.); id. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 274. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (2011) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 23 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.). 
 275. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 276. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(O’Connor, J.). 
 277. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548 (2007) (describing Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment claims filed by rancher against federal land officials). 
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Marshaling that evidence, I advance two points here to support a 
causal link between judicial independence and fault-based rationing 
of constitutional remedies. First, notwithstanding the clichéd image of 
a federal judiciary as weak and dependent upon the political 
branches,278 historians have developed an account of the federal 
judiciary as an institution that as a branch has accreted gradually a 
great deal of autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests.279 
Second, empirical work identifies caseload management as a core 
institutional interest of the federal judiciary. Vindicating institutional 
autonomy in the federal judicial context translates as managing the 
flow of cases. Focusing on the period of time in which the fault rule 
developed—the late 1970s and early 1980s—in particular reveals 
considerable circumstantial evidence that the Justices viewed 
constitutional remediation as problematic in caseload terms. Both the 
judiciary’s means and its motives for fault-based remedial rationing, 
in short, are amply supported by available evidence. 
1. The Judiciary’s Institutional Interest in Caseload Management.  
Consider first the historical trajectory of branch-level independence. 
At the time of the Founding, the constitutional text vested Congress 
with broad formal authority over the jurisdictional structure and 
funding of the federal courts.280 Nevertheless, post-Founding 
developments rendered such authority increasingly formal rather 
than real. Rather than a function of constitutional text, therefore, 
judicial independence at a branch level has emerged as a result of 
institutional developments over the long run of American history.281 
There was nothing inevitable or necessary, moreover, about this 
development. Instead, institutional pathways in historical time are 
contingent matters, vulnerable to the accidents of personality and 
 
 278. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasizing judicial weakness in comparison to the executive and the legislature). 
 279. For an account of “branch independence” as the power “to operate according to 
procedural rules and administrative machinery that it fashions for itself,” as distinct from 
individual judges’ independence, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges 
and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 837–
38, 845 (1995). 
 280. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (granting Congress broad jurisdictional control); see also 
Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892–94 (2008) (noting 
“the traditional view” of Article III is that Congress has plenary power over federal 
jurisdiction). 
 281. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative 
Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 746 (1994) (arguing based on a comparative analysis that 
“[j]udicial independence is not primarily a matter of constitutional text”). 
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exogenous shocks. Regardless of the particular pathway taken, 
however, it is inevitable that an institution crafted in a handful of 
words in 1789 would evolve, mutate, and even metastasize in 
unexpected ways over two hundred years of historical time.282 
Recent historical work zeroes in upon the first part of the 
twentieth century as a turning point. During this period, the federal 
judiciary successfully lobbied Congress to delegate important 
authority over key jurisdictional and administrative powers to the 
bench. In 1922, for example, Congress created the Conference of 
Senior Circuit Judges,283 a modest entity later to develop into the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, a full-scale bureaucracy 
with statutory authority to lobby by “submit[ting] to Congress . . . its 
recommendations for legislation.”284 In 1925, Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft engaged in “unprecedented efforts” to lobby Congress 
into granting the Supreme Court almost unfettered discretion over its 
caseload, near plenary authority to set its own agenda, and freedom 
to determine how and why it would intervene on matters of national 
salience.285 In 1934, Congress “was compelled to delegate power to the 
Court” to set rules for the judiciary in the Rules Enabling Act, 
signaling that “the federal judiciary had arrived as a power player in 
the national political scene.”286 The subsequent creation of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts further weakened executive 
branch influence on the judiciary.287 Over this period, the executive 
branch also extended support to the judiciary, which it viewed as a 
vehicle for pursuing its own political agenda, in effect checking 
congressional leverage of jurisdictional controls.288 The net result of 
 
 282. This is the central thesis of American Political Development (APD) theory, i.e., that “a 
polity in all its different parts is constructed historically, over time” such that “the nature and 
prospects of any single part will best be understood within the long course of political 
formation.” KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004).  
 283. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 331). 
 284. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 331, 62 Stat. 683, 902 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 331). 
 285. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After 
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2000). 
 286. CROWE, supra note 23, at 224 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)). 
 287. Id. at 231–34. 
 288. Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 250, 260 (2012) (“The executive has a strong incentive to use its independent role in the 
enactment and enforcement of federal law to preserve the scope of federal jurisdiction.”); see 
also Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 85 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 435 (2005) 
(“The Taft, Harding, and Coolidge administrations fought to staff the federal judiciary with 
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these accumulated reforms was to empower the judiciary with the 
institutional instruments and procedural avenues to pursue its (self-
defined) interests. 
Capturing this rise in branch-level judicial independence, 
political scientist Kevin McGuire has assembled a longitudinal index 
of the federal judiciary’s institutionalization.289 This index bundles 
measures of the Supreme Court’s institutional differentiation from 
other federal entities, the durability of its interests, and its autonomy 
from other political forces.290 Measured over the twentieth century, 
McGuire’s index evinces a steady upward trend line such that by the 
1960s, the Court had become a “distinctive and independent force 
within the federal government.”291 McGuire’s conclusion is supported 
by a second set of studies examining how the Court exercises judicial 
review. These studies of time trends in judicial exercise of the power 
to invalidate state and federal statutes identifies a peak in the early 
twentieth century and another peak from the 1960s through the 
1980s.292 To the extent that judicial willingness to invalidate duly 
enacted laws is a metric of judicial independence, the late twentieth 
century marks one of its high water marks.293 
This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of 
evidence that judges act upon the basis of institutional interests 
determined by their position within Article III. Of course, it is well 
 
political actors prone to construe ambiguous Constitutional and statutory language against 
labor.”). Political parties, acting across institutional lines, have also supported the growth of 
judicial power. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 
at viii (1981) (describing courts as institutions “by which central political regimes consolidate 
their control over the countryside”); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts 
to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 511, 513 (2002).  
 289. See McGuire, supra note 23, at 130–33.  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 135. Crowe argues that judicial autonomy requires political differentiation, 
organization capacities, and political legitimacies—qualities that the Court obtained in the 1920s 
under Chief Justice Taft. Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political 
Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL. 73, 76 (2007).  
 292. See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 583, 587 (2012) 
(identifying the post–Civil War era as a turning point in institutional development for the 
Supreme Court); Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The 
Roberts Court and the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2228 fig.1 
(2014). 
 293. Of course, the rate of invalidation is likely also a function of the rate of passage of 
unconstitutional laws, and also the ideological gap between the Court and elected bodies at 
state and federal levels. Even without holding these constant, the higher rates of invalidation are 
hard to square with a Court that lacked for confidence in its own institutional station. 
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known that the policy preferences of appointing presidents 
powerfully shape the distribution of federal judicial candidates 
presented to and confirmed by the Senate.294 A recent empirical study 
by Professor Thomas Keck thus concludes that judicial motivations 
“are shaped in part by a sense of institutional duty.”295 Keck examined 
three possible explanations for the Supreme Court’s decision to 
invalidate federal statutes: partisan differences, policy disagreements, 
and institutional disagreements. Contra accounts that focus on the 
partisan drivers of judicial review, Keck concluded that more than 60 
percent of federal laws struck down between 1981 and 2005 are 
consistent with an institutional account of judicial review in which the 
Justices’ “motivation is the desire to defend judicial authority against 
incursions from the other branches.”296 In contrast, most instances of 
judicial review in that time period “fit uneasily” with a policy or 
partisan differences account.297 Keck’s study concerns federal 
statutory invalidations, not the regulation of state criminal justice 
systems. But it would be extraordinary if the Justices’ preferences 
varied not just in quality but also in kind between different domains. 
There is hence no reason to think that his inferences would not 
extend to the doctrinal areas discussed here. 
If the judiciary possesses both a degree of autonomy from other 
branches and also a distinct understanding of its institutional 
interests, it becomes necessary to identify those interests. Theoretical, 
empirical, and self-reported data from the federal bench 
demonstrates that moderating the flow of cases, and in particular 
requests for constitutional remedies, comprises a central element of 
the Article III judiciary’s institutional interests. 
 
 294. Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential Versus Home 
State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District Courts, 
36 LAW & SOC. REV. 657, 666 (2002) (expecting to find “that the practice of senatorial courtesy 
might lead to judicial appointments consistent with the views of home state senators” but 
discovering that “presidential preference is more than twice as influential as home state 
senatorial preferences”); see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 257, 278 & n.105 (2005) (noting the “predictive success of the presidential-appointment 
measure of [judicial] ideology”). 
 295. Keck, supra note 25, at 323; see also Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, 
The Political Economy of Judging, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2009) (noting that a consensus 
view that “institutional factors affect judicial outcomes”) (footnote omitted). 
 296. Keck, supra note 25, at 336. For example, consider here the judicial response to 
legislative and executive efforts to roll back the Miranda rule. See Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (invalidating purported legislative substitute for Miranda). 
 297. Keck, supra note 25, at 336. 
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At a theoretical level, Judge Richard Posner has posited 
“leisure” as a central element in the judicial utility function.298 
Empirical studies confirm Posner’s intuition. These show that federal 
judges, like any other supplier of labor, are averse to excessive 
demands on their time.299 Because these demands are determined on 
an institution-wide basis, it follows that federal judges must attend to 
their individual interest in minimizing unwanted effort through 
doctrinal tools that are systemic in character. Consistent with both the 
narrow and the broad interpretation of institutional interests, both 
liberal and conservative Justices alike express concern about the 
ability of the federal courts to fulfill their adjudicative role given 
rising caseloads.300 Rising caseloads have already overwhelmed courts’ 
ability to give individualized consideration to every discrete matter, 
and led to the substitution of law clerk and staff attorney 
consideration in lieu of Article III eyes.301 
The theoretical and empirical evidence aligns with the historical 
record and self-reports from the Justices. By the 1980s, judges and 
scholars uniformly defined the problem of “judicial reform” as 
primarily a “problem . . . of workload.”302 This resulted in a series of 
commissions, starting with the Study Group on the Caseload of the 
Supreme Court, created by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1971, to 
“study backlogs in judicial business, inadequacies in judicial 
performance, and potential reforms in in judicial organization or 
administration.”303 The Study Group and its successors, the 
Commission on Revision of the Appellate System and the Hruska 
Commission, failed to catalyze legislative action, but nonetheless 
 
 298. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 780 (2009); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, 
Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994). 
 299. See generally Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Effect of Judicial Expediency on 
Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2007) (recounting empirical evidence of 
an effort aversion among federal judges). 
 300. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. 
REV. 634, 642 (1974); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, 
and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7–13 (1983); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Are 
the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371 (1982). 
 301. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS IN CRISIS 83–98 (2013) (documenting declining use of oral argument 
and increasing use of law clerks and staff attorneys by the circuit courts of appeals under 
caseload pressure).  
 302. CROWE, supra note 23, at 249.  
 303. Id. at 250–51. 
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“raised awareness” of the caseload concern.304 Individual Justices 
continued to raise the same concern after these commissions wound 
up. Reflecting on the courts’ experience from the 1960s through the 
1980s, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked not only on “the great 
increase of judicial business handled by the federal courts,” but also 
“the increasing complexity of the issues now handled by the federal 
courts.”305 Of course, this was not the first time that federal judges had 
complained of capacity constraints.306 But it seems clear that the late 
1970s and 1980s were a time at which the pressures of adjudication 
were felt to be especially acute, and thus a warrant for both study and 
institutional change. 
2. Caseload Management in the Era of Fault.  The late 1970s and 
early 1980s were distinct in another way: they were the beginning of a 
fourfold increase in the rate of incarceration in state and federal 
prisons.307 At the time, crime appeared a major, and increasingly 
intractable, national problem. Crime rates had been rising since the 
1960s, with no prospect of a plateau in sight. The national homicide 
rate, for example, had doubled in the decade after 1964, and was 
continuing to rise in 1980.308 Street-level crime was also perceived as a 
national problem, warranting responses from national institutions. In 
1981, for example, the new Attorney General William French Smith, 
convened a task force to determine how federal resources could be 
switched from white-collar to street crime.309 Further, “[i]n the 1980s 
and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was influenced by the 
 
 304. Id. at 251–52. 
 305. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in A Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 1, 3. 
 306. During Reconstruction, for example, federal courts were tasked with a remedial role in 
the former Confederacy that exceeded their capacities. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 151 (2015) 
(describing experience of capacity constraints during Reconstruction). 
 307. See WESTERN, supra note 86, at 13. 
 308. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 5 (2007). Homicide 
rates would drop precipitously, and unexpectedly, in the early 1990s. Id.  
 309. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS 47 (1997); see also Harry A. Chernoff, Christopher M. Kelly & John R. 
Kroger, Essay, The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 533 (1996) (discussing 
Reagan’s approach to crime). Other accounts, however, trace the federal interest in crime back 
to the beginning of the twentieth century. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 242, at 55–76. 
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notion that the country was facing an epidemic of ‘juvenile 
superpredators.’”310 
Federal criminal-adjudicative policy shifted accordingly. The 
absolute volume of federal criminal defendants had fluctuated 
substantially since World War II. It dropped in the late 1940s and 
1950s due to declining immigration enforcement. But it began 
“surg[ing] between 1970 and 1977 and then [falling] back temporarily 
from 1977 to 1980,” before growing “in almost every year from 
1980.”311 Indeed, the “number of federal criminal prosecutions has 
grown steadily, with little fluctuation, since 1980, at a rate of about 
1,500 additional cases per year” with “a significant part” of that 
growth due to “the growing number of controlled substance 
prosecutions and stepped-up enforcement against immigration law 
violators.”312 As a result, the number of federal offenders imprisoned 
for drug offenses ballooned from 4,900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007.313 
From the perspective of the Supreme Court in the early 1980s, the 
then-incipient growth of federal criminal caseloads might have 
seemed to portend serious future pressures on federal dockets. 
Given this constellation of factors—most of which would have 
been readily apparent to the Justices—it is possible to hypothesize 
that the incipient pressures of mass incarceration on the federal 
courts were not lost on the Court, even at the beginning of the 1980s. 
These pressures took the form of greatly increased volumes of 
suppression motions and habeas petitions (from both federal and 
state prisoners). Hence, during the period at which the fault rule was 
developed, the Court was at the acme of its institutional autonomy, 
and also inclined by habit and instruction to view the volume of 
litigation as not just a problem, but the defining problem for the 
federal courts. That problem, finally, likely seemed most pressing in 
the criminal law domain, where increasing reliance on the carceral 
 
 310. Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 
89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 990 (2014). 
 311. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005). 
 312. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 16–17 (2012). 
 313. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429 (2013). 
For a more detailed account of the rise of mass incarceration, see Franklin E. Zimring, 
Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal Punishment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: 
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 145, 145–46 (David Garland ed., 2001).  
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state to solve social problems produced larger and larger caseload 
pressures on the federal judiciary.314 
Can the rise of fault be explained as a response to rising crime 
rates without regard to the freestanding institutional concerns of the 
judiciary? There are a number of reasons for resisting this reductive 
conclusion. First, as already recounted,315 the gatekeeping fault rule 
did not emerge solely at the behest of Justices appointed by 
presidents centrally concerned with crime control. Rather, it has been 
a bipartisan project. 
Second, while Justices have expressed concern with crime 
control, they have since the 1950s repeatedly articulated their 
resistance to constitutional remediation in terms of the judiciary’s 
institutional interest in caseload management. Part II.B contains 
many of these statements, ranging from Justice White’s early 
concerns about the Fourth Amendment suppression remedy316 to 
Justice Breyer’s concern about the burden of constitutional tort 
litigation in the lower courts.317 There is no reason to view these 
statements as disingenuous or false. Nor are such judicial expressions 
of concern over the institutional effects of constitutional remedies 
isolated. In respect to each line of ex post remedies doctrine 
examined above, Justices have repeatedly expressed concern about 
the manageability of litigation flows absent something like a fault 
rule. In the constitutional tort context, for example, Justice Black 
articulated a concern with “frivolous” suits in his Bivens dissent.318 In 
the habeas context, concerns about the “disproportionate amount of 
[judicial] time and energy” required for postconviction review have 
long been stock elements in the Court’s opinions.319 And recently 
installed limits to the exclusionary rule have been underwritten by 
 
 314. It was well known that the then-nascent war on drugs would produce many more 
inmates. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
4–7 (1995); see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 131–32 (2001) 
(documenting the Reagan Administration’s turn from rehabilitation to retributive theories of 
punishment). Hence, the Justices had good reason to be aware of how the number of 
suppression motions and habeas petitions would increase.  
 315. See supra Part II.B. 
 316. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 260–261 and accompanying text. 
 318. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 428–
29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court expressed concern about the 
volume of § 1983 cases, but expressed its concerns in terms of the “diversion of official energy” 
rather than the cost to the judiciary. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).  
 319. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 282 n.6 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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worries about the “constant flood of alleged failures” to conform to 
the Fourth Amendment.320 Remedial reform is thus perceived by the 
Justices themselves as a response to the rising demand for 
adjudication, a demand that is plausibly linked to the recent growth 
and expected continued growth of the punitive, policing, and 
incarcerating state. 
Evidence from the Justices’ own lips, moreover, undermines 
another potential counterargument to the effect that a fault rule 
cannot be explained by caseload concerns because such a rule would 
not influence the behavior of habeas petitioners, the public defenders 
who represent most criminal defendants, or those aggrieved by 
perceived governmental abuse. The Leon Court, for example, 
worried that the availability of suppression would diminish the rate of 
plea bargaining.321 Empirical evidence that this is not so has done 
nothing to dent the force of the fault rule in the Fourth Amendment 
context.322 Setting the effect of suppression on plea bargaining to one 
side, though, it is hard to believe that the fault rule has not altered the 
incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys dependent on contingency-fee 
payoffs, public defenders determining how to ration scarce time and 
resources,323 or prisoners who may face real trade-offs in respect to 
how to allocate time and effort within prison.324 And even if the 
magnitude of these effects is in question, a fault rule might have 
distinctive appeal to the Justices because it is a legal intervention that 
has a clear judicial pedigree and feel, unlike (say) changes to 
substantive criminal law or the funding of either prosecutors’ or 
criminal defenders’ offices. It is not implausible, that is, to think of 
 
 320. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006). 
 321. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
 322. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 
1983 AM. B. & FOUND. RES. J. 611, 668 (1983) (finding no evidence of an effect on plea 
bargaining). 
 323. For an argument that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does create needless 
litigation, and that the resources it consumes would be better allocated elsewhere, see William J. 
Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 
(1997) (“The exclusionary rule generates a lot of litigation—tens of thousands of contested 
suppression motions each year. That litigation is displacing something else, and the something 
else may well have more to do with guilt and innocence.”). 
 324. For an impressive analysis of the hazards of incarceration, and the costly strategies 
necessary to navigate them, see generally DAVID SKARBEK, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE 
UNDERWORLD: HOW PRISON GANGS GOVERN THE AMERICAN PENAL SYSTEM (2014). As 
Skarbek elegantly and comprehensively shows, the common caricature of a habeas petitioner 
idling away his days filing endless writs with no other demands on his time is simply unfounded.  
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fault as an obvious first resort for a judge steeped in common-law 
ideas seeking to manage docket pressures.325 Finally, it is worth 
emphasizing that concerns about crime and judicial capacity not only 
can be complementary but can also interact: if institutional concerns 
were all that mattered, for example, it might simply have altered 
substantive law to be more favorable to plaintiffs, thereby 
encouraging higher settlement rates, or imposed constitutional 
constraints on substantive criminal law. Concern with crime removes 
these possibilities from the judicial agenda, and pushes the Court to 
deploy statist instruments to manage its dockets. 
In tracing a causal chain from the political and social facts of 
mass incarceration to judicial doctrine, my argument here contrasts 
and conflicts with Professor William Stuntz’s revered criticism of the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases. Stuntz argues that the 
judicial regulation of criminal procedure had a perverse effect 
because “the very existence of defendant-protective procedural 
doctrine tends to push toward lower funding and broader substantive 
criminal law.”326 In this fashion, Stuntz suggests that doctrinal change 
conduced to larger institutional change. Stuntz’s story, however, is 
hard to square with the chronological evidence. As Professor Stephen 
Schulhofer has explained, key changes to criminal sentencing are 
removed by decades from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
decisions.327 Further, other Western nations that experienced the same 
punitive turn did so without any criminal procedure revolution 
against which to react, suggesting that “[p]rofound structural changes 
in Western industrial society lay at the heart of these developments, 
not judicial doctrine.”328 But Schulhofer does not ask the logical next 
question: Did those “profound structural changes” influence doctrine 
in ways that alter the distribution, and at times the existence, of 
constitutional remediation? And if so, what mediated those effects? 
The argument developed here suggests that it did so via the 
judiciary’s institutional concerns. For there is good reason to think 
that even if the Court has not shaped the development of criminal 
 
 325. I am grateful to Samuel Bray for this suggestion. 
 326. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 27, at 64 (emphasis omitted). Stuntz’s claim has 
been understood as historical and causal in nature. See Robert Weisberg, Crime and Law: An 
American Tragedy, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2012) (explaining Stuntz’s claim to be that 
“the noble commitment to constitutional procedure as a way of redressing the brutalities and 
inequalities of the criminal justice system was a disastrous historical turn”). 
 327. Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 1076–77. 
 328. Id. at 1078.  
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justice institutions, the latter have directly impinged upon its ability to 
respond to constitutional wrongs. 
The Court, in short, had both the means and the motivation to 
translate its institutional autonomy into a fault-based regime of 
remedial rationing. Both historical and contemporaneous evidence 
suggest that judges in fact define their interests in institutional terms, 
and that managing the federal courts’ caseload is central to their 
conception of this institutional interest. Against this backdrop, the 
innovations charted in Part I may have seemed like logical ways of 
vindicating the institutional independence of the federal judiciary. 
This diagnosis further suggests that the installation of the fault rule 
will prove relatively durable regardless of the ideological preferences 
of the next president to engage in significant appointments to the 
Court. Liberal or conservative, new Justices are likely to experience 
and endorse institutional perspectives on docket and case load 
management just as their ideological confreres have. To look to 
changing patterns of judicial appointment as a solvent of remedial 
rationing in the constitutional context, therefore, may be whistling in 
the wind. 
D. Institutional Interests and the Boundaries of the Fault Rule 
There is one final argument for glossing the fault rule as a 
function of institutional preferences, and not just as a grossly 
ideological effect. Under current doctrine, fault plays a regulative role 
with respect to some—but not all—channels of judicial review. Where 
it applies, fault operates as a tax on constitutional claim-making. It 
thereby disincentivizes claims. Where it does not apply, the absence 
of a fault rule is in effect a subsidy, making such challenges more 
attractive. By shifting the boundaries of fault, the Court elicits and 
also tamps down on different forms of claim-making. An examination 
of the contours of the Court’s fault-based regime suggests that the 
current dispensation is well designed to maximize the federal bench’s 
prestige while minimizing its labor costs. That is, the contours of the 
fault rule correspond to, and thereby promote, the institutional 
interests of the judiciary.329 
Because this argument turns on some careful parsing of doctrine, 
I develop it in two stages. First, I identify contexts in which the Court 
 
 329. I do not mean to suggest that any and all judicial doctrine is explained by this mix of 
labor and prestige concerns, only that the detection of their influence here is further evidence 
that ideology and its fellow travelers are not the sole explanations for the rise of fault. 
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has declined to install a fault rule. Second, I explain how the resulting 
doctrinal contours can be explained in terms of the judiciary’s 
institutional interests. This account, while circumstantial, provides 
one more item of evidence for attributing fault-based rationing to the 
exercise of judicial independence. 
1. Exceptions to the Fault Rule.  Recall first that constitutional 
torts, suppression motions, and habeas petitions do not exhaust the 
universe of procedural mechanisms for constitutional claim-making. 
Courts also entertain asks for injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte 
Young330 and actions for declaratory relief.331 Whereas rights claimants 
seeking relief using the former mechanism must demonstrate fault,332 
litigants seeking the latter forms of relief need not show anything 
more than the bare fact of constitutional violation. In a Young action, 
a defendant might invoke traditional equitable doctrines of unclean 
hands333 and undue hardship,334 which both focus on a kind of fault. 
But few, if any, reported cases turn on these rules, suggesting that 
they do not play a large role in constitutional litigation.335 At least as a 
general matter, therefore, the availability of equitable relief in 
constitutional cases does not turn on fault. 
There is, in short, a difference in the cost of asserting a 
constitutional right that depends on which procedural mechanism is 
employed. The ensuing differential in expected remedial value is 
amplified by the simple fact that injunctive and declarative forms of 
relief—unlike damages, suppression, or vacatur of a conviction—are 
typically available prophylactically before a violation has occurred.336 
Prevention is generally more valuable than post hoc measures that 
 
 330. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 331. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra Part I. 
 333. See, e.g., Concilio de Salud Integral de Loiza, Inc. v. Perez-Perdomo, 551 F.3d 10, 11 
(1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting injunctive relief on the basis of unclean hands). 
 334. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship and the 
Doctrinal Train Wreck of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2012). I have been unable 
to locate any reported case in which a Young remedy was denied because of undue hardship to 
the defendant.  
 335. In addition, neither the unclean hands doctrine nor the undue hardship doctrine train 
on the kind of fault described in Part I. 
 336. Moreover, sovereign immunity doctrine creates a supplemental incentive to seek 
forward-looking relief rather than compensatory damages. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court 
hence distinguished permissible judicial orders that required the expenditure of funds to ensure 
future compliance with the Constitution, from an impermissible judicial order of 
“compensation” for past harm. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–68 (1974). 
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rarely make plaintiffs entirely whole. As a result, “federal courts 
frequently entertain actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief 
aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely or 
highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”337 
The 2013–14 Supreme Court Term provides illustrations. Susan 
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus338 involved a facial First Amendment 
challenge to an Ohio statute criminalizing false statements about 
candidates during political campaigns.339 Even though the only 
complaint against the plaintiffs at bar had been dismissed, the 
unanimous Court discerned a “substantial” enough “threat of future 
enforcement” to establish standing.340 The same term, in McCullen v. 
Coakley,341 the Court adjudicated another First Amendment challenge 
to a Massachusetts law establishing buffer zones around abortion 
clinics based on the plaintiffs’ expressed desire to enter those zones in 
the future, rather than any past violation of the law.342 Anticipatory 
challenges of this ilk, of course, are not limited to the First 
Amendment context.343 
The doctrine, however, contains another important wrinkle. Not 
all anticipatory suits are created equal. There is an important 
difference between “facial” challenges344 to the semantic content of 
the statute’s text, such as in Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen, and 
challenges to ongoing institutional practices. Whereas facial 
challenges to laws face low hurdles, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,345 
the Court imposed a high, often insurmountable, barrier to challenges 
to official practices by dint of a specific element of Article III 
standing rules.346 
 
 337. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1160 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 338. Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
 339. Id. at 2338 (quoting and discussing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.21(B)). 
 340. Id. at 2340, 2345. 
 341. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 342. Id. at 2527–28 (describing plaintiffs as previously complying with the Massachusetts 
buffer law).  
 343. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997) (describing the due 
process right to die); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (describing the due process right to abortion). 
 344. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 
(2005) (“What really distinguishes a facial challenge is not its breadth, but that it involves an 
attack on the general rule embodied in a statute.”). 
 345. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 346. Id. at 97–98. 
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To see how, consider the Court’s divergent formulations of 
plaintiffs’ threshold burdens in two cases. In Susan B. Anthony List, 
the plaintiffs satisfied Article III by showing that their conduct was 
“‘arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish to challenge.”347 
Simply based on the verbal content of the challenged Ohio statute, 
the unanimous Court had “no difficulty” concluding this threshold 
had been surmounted.348 In Lyons, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief 
against a police chokehold practice was asked to make “the incredible 
assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always 
choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, 
whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning 
or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in 
such manner.”349 Lyons in effect required a plaintiff challenging a 
practice to collate a large body of evidence, not just about what the 
law is, but about empirical regularities in the world. This is costly, 
often prohibitively so. Perhaps unsurprising, a 2000 analysis found 
that across 1,200 reported decisions applying Lyons 1,152 ended in 
dismissal on standing grounds.350 
To summarize, the Court applies a fault rule to individualized 
tort actions, suppression motions, and habeas petitions—all of which 
challenge granular, singular official acts. No fault rule, however, 
applies to requests for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief 
against unconstitutional laws. Ex ante challenges to institutional 
practices, by contrast, while facing no fault rule, are impeded by 
Lyons rule. The net result is in some tension with the notional stated 
Supreme Court disfavor of hypothetical351 and facial352 requests for 
constitutional review: a relative subsidy for prophylactic facial 
 
 347. Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2344 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). 
 348. Id.  
 349. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (limiting the 
availability of ex ante relief against law enforcement officers on grounds that anticipate the 
Lyons analysis).  
 350. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens 
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399 n.57 (2000). 
 351. Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); accord Lewis v. Cont’l 
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). 
 352. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (stating a 
preference for narrow, as-applied challenges as opposed to the “strong medicine” of facial 
invalidation (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))); accord United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 
U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912). 
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challenges to laws, a relative tax on individualized claims and ex ante 
challenges to institutional practices. 
2. Judicial Interests as a Determinant of the Contours of Fault.  
This doctrinal arrangement can be nicely explained by an account 
cognizant of the institutional interests of the judiciary. If we assume 
that judges’ interests are refracted through an institutional lens, and 
thereby focused on managing the federal bench’s workload, current 
doctrinal arrangements make surprising sense. To begin with, notice 
that caseload pressure can be more effectively relieved by regulating 
the broad river of ex post remedial demands rather than by 
staunching the comparatively small number of anticipatory requests 
for relief. Ex post remedies tends to be discrete rather than aggregate 
in nature, and hence more numerous. Different acts of police 
misconduct, different trial errors by prosecutors, and different judicial 
errors each require distinct suppression hearings, habeas petitions, 
and damages awards to determine facts and allocate relief. These 
accumulate, imposing a rising toll on judicial-economy ambitions. A 
fault rule that plays a gatekeeping function (such as qualified 
immunity or § 2254(d)(1)) substitutes simple, mechanical protocols at 
the pretrial stage for complex, fact-intensive inquiries at trial. This has 
the effect of reducing trial costs, not to mention expenditures on the 
remedies portion of litigation. Even if a fault rule does not reduce the 
volume of these cases, it does render their adjudication less costly. It 
is far easier to determine whether there has been a clear and 
unambiguous violation of a constitutional rule than to determine 
whether there has been any constitutional violation. This has the 
supplemental benefit of enabling delegation to adjuncts such as staff 
attorneys and law clerks, thus easing the labor of adjudication.353 
Similarly, the distinction between challenges to laws (such as 
Susan B. Anthony List) and challenges to institutional practices (such 
as Lyons) reflects the same concern about the managerial costs of 
different remedies.354 A challenge to an institutional practice may 
require a remedy that involves ongoing supervision and judicial 
involvement, whereas a challenge to a legal text can be resolved by 
 
 353. By contrast, other methods of mitigating case load burdens, such as “more detailed 
pleading and supporting affidavits,” Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 183, at 1821, might have the 
effect of sorting for nonfrivolous cases, but only by raising per capita decision costs.  
 354. Bray, supra note 91, at 1146 n.247 (noting that Lyons can be explained by the 
“emphatically managerial injunction” sought in that case).  
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the fiat of a judicial order. By making the former easier to obtain than 
the latter, the Court eases the demand for judicial resources.355 
This simple account can be supplemented by considering the 
bench’s institutional interest in public reputation.356 A judicial interest 
in prestige explains both the extent of the fault rule, and its 
exceptions. Federal judges have long expressed their belief that 
“federal courts” are “‘too important’ for certain kinds of cases.”357 
“Petty” cases are repudiated by leading jurists as ill-suited to federal 
adjudication.358 Doctrine and judicial lobbying affirms this belief. For 
example, the Court developed through common-law adjudication an 
“appellate review” model of administrative agency oversight as a 
means to avoid being called upon to decide “matters that were not 
properly judicial but were rather ‘administrative’ in nature.”359 In 
effect, the appellate review model mitigated caseload demands 
created by the new federal regulatory state. 
Federal judges also preserve their prestige by preventing 
inflation of the federal bench. Seventy-five years after it refined the 
appellate review model, the federal judiciary has been among the 
most important lobbies in Congress resisting the extension of the 
prestigious Article III badge to bankruptcy judges,360 while at the 
 
 355. Can these doctrinal distinctions also be explained in ideological terms? It is not 
implausible to think that challenges to laws have a different ideological valence to challenges to 
institutional practices. It suffices here to observe that doctrine advances both ideological and 
institutional interests, and it may be misleading and unnecessary to choose between the two.  
 356. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 43, 48 
(2013) (positing “the desire for a good reputation” as part of the judicial utility function).  
 357. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 972 (2000) (tracing back arguments of this kind to Chief 
Justice Taft). 
 358. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional 
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 980–82 (1926) (arguing that the Constitution 
does not require Article III judges or juries to determine “petty” criminal cases); see also 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 456–57 (1893) (invalidating jurisdiction 
that required courts to engage in “administrative” rather than judicial functions). 
 359. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate 
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944, 990 (2011) (describing the 
federal judiciary’s “fear of contamination” by involvement in administration). 
 360. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 157–58 (2001) (documenting longer patterns of judicial resistance); Geraldine Mund, 
Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part 
Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 346 n.18, 347–53 (2007) (describing various 
channels of influence from Chief Justice Burger and the federal judiciary into the drafting of the 
1978 bankruptcy legislation, including formal testimony and backstage lobbying).  
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same time (without discernable irony) invalidating the latter’s review 
of state-law tort claims.361 This interest in preserving institutional 
prestige aligns with judges’ interest in managing caseloads. Courts do 
not maximize their prestige by simply extending their dockets as far 
as possible. To the contrary, there is an inverse relationship between 
docket pressures and prestige. A bench with fewer, more interesting 
cases is, all else being equal, a more alluring and prestigious sinecure 
than one with a greater number of less interesting, more mundane 
cases. Efforts to insulate federal courts from the messy, unrewarding 
labor of adjudicating discrete, dispersed, and unglamorous 
constitutional violations result in more judicial time being available 
for more prestigious work. They are also consonant with a priority for 
high-profile challenges to laws—all the best to reinforce the 
impression that federal courts are (or wish to be) high-minded forums 
of principle, not mere fact-grubbers sorting through the detritus of 
the modern regulatory and police state. Cases such as Susan B. 
Anthony List and McCullen are exemplars of a species of prestigious, 
high-profile suits that are elicited by leaving unregulated the channels 
for injunctive or declaratory relief. The continued supply of these 
cases creates the impression of a Court diligent in its enforcement of 
the Constitution, even though the Court is spared the hard labor of 
vindicating most “petty” constitutional claims that arise from 
quotidian crime control and bureaucratic behavior. Hence, the 
argument from judicial economy developed here can also be 
understood in terms of the reputational interests of the federal courts. 
* * * 
This Part has developed evidence to the effect that the 
institutional interests of the judiciary have shaped the emergence of 
the fault role. I have not tried to show that such interests are exclusive 
of other concerns. Rather, I have explored the inadequacy of political 
and ideological explanations, and then developed the case for 
attributing some causal effect to the judiciary’s institutional interest in 
case management. The net effect is to supply a more nuanced account 
of doctrinal change than the mechanically ideological stories that to 
date have dominated. 
 
 361. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011); see generally Anthony J. Casey & Aziz 
Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496468 [http://perma.cc/T2XG-EXRZ] 
(describing and criticizing this line of cases). 
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III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAULT RULE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
The primary aim of this Article is to describe how scarce judicial 
resources are allocated to the task of constitutional remedies, and to 
offer a hypothesis about one set of causal forces that to date have 
been largely ignored. This Part turns from that descriptive and 
analytic task to some normative implications of the causal claim 
advanced here. To be clear, the causal linkage between judicial 
independence and remedial rationing that I have proposed in Parts I 
and II raises a host of important puzzles. My aim here is not to 
resolve all of those questions, but rather to flag what strike me as the 
most important of them. Hence, I set forth some of the welfarist and 
distributive implications of fault-based rationing of remedial 
resources first, and then conclude by limning the consequences of the 
present analysis for standard accounts of the Separation of Powers. 
A. Distributive Implications 
The descriptive account offered in Parts I and II of this Article 
has illumined a doctrinal superstructure that imposes low transaction 
costs upon ex ante challenges to the verbal content of laws or 
regulation, and high transaction costs on both challenges to 
institutional practices, and also discrete requests for granular after-
the-fact remedies. The former, therefore, are prioritized over the 
latter. This resulting system of implicit taxes and subsidies on private 
behavior has complex welfarist and distributional implications. 
Characterization of these effects depends on how one defines social 
welfare—which is controversial—and whether one thinks 
distributional concerns are salient—which is also divisive. Rather 
than trying to answer these deep underlying questions, my aim here is 
to sketch briefly how constitutional remedies doctrine influences 
valuable social ends without trying to define conclusively what those 
goals should be. I focus on three vectors of welfare and distributional 
effects from the doctrinal arrangements mapped in this Article that 
run through, respectively, different sorts of constitutional errors, 
different rights, and different litigants. My aim here is not to 
pronounce judgments on those effects, but simply to elucidate their 
operation. 
First, the Court’s remedial doctrine entails that different kinds of 
constitutional errors receive different treatment. On the one hand, a 
constitutional flaw that is manifest on the face of a generally 
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applicable statute or regulation, that operates directly against 
individuals as a primary rule without the intermediation of any 
prosecutorial discretion on the part of an enforcing agency, is most 
vulnerable to judicial correction. At the other end of the spectrum, a 
constitutionally flawed act or practice, unmemorialized in written text 
and dispersed through time and space in a sporadic, even stochastic, 
distribution, cannot be remedied ex ante. Instead, it will receive only 
the light review that can be exercised under the anesthetizing regime 
of the gross fault rule that covers ex post remedies. Stated otherwise, 
errors that occur during the liquidation of standards (which generally 
occurs after a violation) receive lighter judicial scrutiny than errors 
embedded in the formulation of a rule (which typically occurs before 
the violation).362 The doctrine hence creates a subtle tilt in favor of 
standards rather than rules where a risk of constitutional challenge is 
present. 
Second, variation in the transaction costs of different remedies 
influences the distribution of resources available for the enforcement 
of distinct rights. The fault rule raises the cost of enforcement where 
it applies because it demands a more onerous showing by litigants. 
This differential in enforcement costs intersects with differences 
between rights. Some rights are easier to enforce ex ante with an 
injunction, while others are easier to enforce ex post by damages, 
suppression, or the vacatur of a conviction. Lowering the price of ex 
ante enforcement thus favors some rights over others. To pick an 
uncontroversial example, First Amendment and Due Process rights 
related to participation in the democratic process363 are most valuable 
when enforced prospectively, and lack obvious commensurable 
monetary substitutes. After an election has been resolved, and one 
candidate is selected over others, there may be no good way to 
mitigate fully infringements on democratic participation rights.364 
 
 362. For an analysis of the rules/standard distinction that underscores its temporal element, 
see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562 
(1992). 
 363. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“In decision after decision, this 
Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in 
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 
504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
 364. The analysis of aggregate voting rights (such as the rights of a particular ethnic or racial 
voting bloc) implicate a more complicated choice of temporal frame. See Adam B. Cox, The 
Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 372–73 (2007). Damages are 
sometimes awarded. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927). 
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Monetary damages would strike many as “hopelessly inadequate.”365 
Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause can also be 
understood as the failure to treat members of a protected class “with 
dignity and respect.”366 Again, compensatory remedies seem poorly 
fitted to the particular harm of being treated as less than human. 
Dignity is not typically thought to be fungible with cash. 
On the other hand, there are many other rights that want for any 
prophylactic remedy, but are arguably addressed in a tolerable 
fashion via damages after the fact. In the takings context, for 
example, the Court has stated that a property owner must pursue 
compensation through state procedures before a Fifth Amendment 
takings claim will “ripen” for the purposes of federal-court 
adjudication,367 and has declined to permit any acceleration of takings 
claims even when the process of state-court adjudication generated 
preclusive effects that barred federal-court relitigation.368 This reflects 
a (perhaps erroneous) belief that ex post remedies are at least 
adequate for unconstitutional takings. Even in the absence of formal 
constraints on ex ante remedies, moreover, practical and epistemic 
constraints may also render ex post claims the only viable pathway. 
Illegal searches that generate no inculpatory evidence, for example, 
may not be predictable before the fact. Indeed, even in jurisdictions 
where unconstitutional searches and police violence are endemic, 
Lyons means the ex post channels of tort actions, suppression 
motions, and postconviction relief are the only game in town. It is this 
class of rights better suited to ex post enforcement that are 
disincentivized by the fault rule. 
Finally, differences in remedial access will also differentiate 
between distinct categories of litigants, both on the plaintiff and on 
the state defendant side. Constitutional-rights claimants are likely 
sensitive to the costs of judicial enforcement. Litigants’ epistemic and 
litigation resources influence the relative costs of different species of 
judicial remedy. An increase in the evidentiary showing or procedural 
 
 365. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
785–90 (1994) (developing a more general account of incommensurability problems in the law). 
 366. Id. at 847–51 (discussing sex discrimination claims). 
 367. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
 368. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005). The net 
effect of Hamilton Bank and San Remo Hotel is not to deprive litigants of a federal forum; 
rather, it is to leave the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction as the sole federal forum for 
certain takings claimants. Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. 
L. REV. 649, 656 (2012).  
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hurdles necessary to secure monetary relief, for example, will 
therefore reduce expressed demand for that form of judicial 
enforcement. The expected value of injunctive relief will vary, by 
contrast, depending on the litigant’s ability to anticipate and file suit 
prior to a governmental action. Along either margin, litigants’ 
demand for constitutional remedies is likely to be elastic.369 Changes 
in the relative prices of remedies will thus change the pool of litigants 
seeking remedies. 
Consider, for example, the Court’s use of the fault rule to 
increase the cost of enforcing rights ex post relative to ex ante 
enforcement in many domains. In expectation, such a change will 
depress litigant demand for rights that can only be vindicated through 
monetary damages. At the same time, it will increase litigant demand 
in respect to rights that can only be vindicated fully by anticipatory 
intervention. It also lowers the cost of constitutional remediation for 
plaintiffs who have the epistemic and social resources to judicial 
assistance before a violation occurs, and increases the cost of such 
remediation for plaintiffs who lack the resources to act before the 
state does. Whether one looks at different effects between rights or 
litigants, therefore the result is the same: some litigants gain, while 
others lose out. Changes to the relative transaction costs of different 
remedies is thus a way for judges to change the mix of litigants that 
benefit from the expenditure of a fixed pool of taxpayer-supported 
judicial resources.370 Recalibrating remedies doctrine, in public choice 
terminology, is a vehicle for implicitly shifting the allocation of 
judicial resources between different interest groups. 
Finally, it is not only rights claimants who are treated differently 
under the current remedial dispensation. The doctrine also 
distinguishes between different state defendants. The current 
remedial architecture channels judicial resources toward the scrutiny 
of centralized fonts of legal authority (such as legislators or 
 
 369. Cf. Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 
1845 (1995) (“[A] tort is elastic to the extent that the number of cases that are filed (demand) 
rises as the transaction costs associated with each case (price) are reduced and the number of 
judicial case resolutions increases (supply).”). Demand for judicial enforcement of some 
individual rights may be inelastic, such that increases in the price of judicial enforcement has no 
effect on the volume of litigation.  
 370. The quantity of resources allocated to the judicial budget, of course, can vary from year 
to year, although in recently years the federal judiciary’s budget has been in decline. See CHIEF 
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4–5 (2013), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/
996U-3UHR] (describing a 5 percent reduction in the annual federal judicial budget).  
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regulation-generating agencies), and away from dispersed, discretion-
exercising officials (such as line officials within dispersed 
bureaucracies, prosecutors and the police371). Consistent with the 
decentralizing impulse at the core of American federalism, the 
remedial doctrine described here makes it easier to challenge to 
concentrated, top-down forms of lawmaking, and at the same time 
raises the price of challenges to dispersed, localized exercises of 
delegated authority. This result is particularly striking in the policing 
context. Recent ethnographies of urban policing have underscored 
the frequency and severity of routine violence inflicted by line 
officers, in particular in African American communities.372 It is 
precisely the lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence, which 
effect many of the least politically powerful communities in the 
United States, that the Court has rendered most difficult to remedy. 
This is consistent with Richard Posner, William Landes, and Lee 
Epstein’s prediction that reduced access to federal courts “weighs 
most heavily on persons seeking to expand legal rights [such as] 
antidiscrimination rights [and] prisoners rights.”373 
Reasonable people will differ about whether these effects on 
different species of violations, different rights, and different litigants 
are warranted or lamentable, just as they disagree on how to 
prioritize between rights and litigants. I do not aim to settle those 
differences here. Nevertheless, this analysis should underscore the 
fact that the fault-based gatekeeping regime for allocating 
constitutional remedies, along with its doctrinal adjuncts, has 
significant downstream effects on important social goals—effects that 
are perhaps all the more surprising given the heterogeneous 
ideological composition of judicial coalitions responsible for that rule. 
The subtle way in which these effects arise means that they have 
never been subject to public scrutiny or debate. At a minimum, 
differences in ultimate normative priors should not undermine the 
conclusion that such sub rosa redistribution of the benefits that flow 
from our Constitution may be problematic simply because of its want 
of transparency. 
 
 371. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 799 n.104 (2006) (stating that Lyons “effectively barred injunctions as a remedy for police 
misconduct”). 
 372. See GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 71–72 (exploring effects of pervasive police violence on 
public attitudes and behavior).  
 373. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 356, at 41.  
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B. Implications for the Separation of Powers 
A second implication of this Article’s analysis bears on 
Separation of Powers theory. The autonomy of the judiciary has long 
been conceived as a central plank of the Constitution’s Separation of 
Powers.374 But the existence of a causal connection between judicial 
independence and a fault-based rule for limiting the availability of 
constitutional relief complicates the traditional account of the 
judiciary’s role in the national government. At a minimum, it shows 
that the policy effects of judicial independence are more volatile than 
generally believed. Read more aggressively, the evidence presented 
here suggests that the successful institutionalization of judicial 
independence can undermine, as much as further, the project of 
realizing constitutional rights. 
There is a deep-seated belief in American constitutional 
jurisprudence of a causal connection between the creation of judicial 
independence and the vindication of individual rights. The French 
political theorist Montesquieu, an influential figure among the 
Framers, cautioned that “liberty” would be lost “if the power of 
judging is not separate from the legislative power and from executive 
power.”375 Introducing the Bill of Rights to the first Congress, James 
Madison prophesized that “independent tribunals of justice” would 
act “in a peculiar manner [as] the guardians of those rights” and “an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
Legislative or Executive.”376 On this view, the purpose of judicial 
independence is to ensure that cases—especially those involving 
prized, basic rights—are decided on their legal merits (however 
defined) rather than on considerations of naked political power.377 
Echoes of Madison’s confidence in the social value of judicial 
independence resound repeatedly today. For example, Judge Deanall 
 
 374. Among “Madison and Hamilton at least, judicial independence was an essential aspect 
of the separation of powers.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 320 (1999); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 299 (1996) (noting that the Framers had “a 
substantive conception of the judiciary as the third branch of government”). 
 375. 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Cambridge ed. 1989) (1748) (“Nor is 
there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from the legislative power and from 
executive power . . . . If it were joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an 
oppressor.”); see also M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
96–97 (Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998) (1967) (placing Montesquieu’s argument in context). 
 376. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789). 
 377. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 972 (2002). 
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Tacha, while serving on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
channeled conventional wisdom in pronouncing that “the 
independent federal judiciary has been a powerful tool in guarding 
the Constitution and the rights of individuals.”378 Similarly, Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox hardly invited controversy when he called 
“[a]n independent judiciary . . . the best guarantee of liberty and 
impartial justice against executive oppression and other executive or 
bureaucratic abuse.”379 The causal connection between judicial 
independence and the vindication of constitutional rights, in short, is, 
for all intents and purposes, conventional wisdom today. 
The analysis developed in this Article suggests that conventional 
wisdom demands caveats. The institutionalization of judicial 
independence does not lead inexorably to the vindication of 
individual constitutional rights. Rather, the effects of endowing the 
federal courts with policy autonomy are contingent upon the interests 
and preferences of judges qua institutional actors. When judges’ 
interests conduce away from the vindication of individual liberty 
interests, judicial independence will promote less, not more, respect 
for those rights. At least in the contemporary context, the 
institutional interests of federal judges have systematically pressed 
toward a constriction of remedial generosity. The result has been the 
transubstantive migration of the fault rule described in Part I.380 
Separation of Powers theory concerning the judiciary from the 
Federalist 78 onward has focused on the negative proposition that 
judicial independence, and therefore the vindication of individual 
rights, simply requires that the courts by free of political influence.381 
At least at the time of the Philadelphia Convention, this causal claim 
rested on theoretical premises rather than on experiential 
foundations. “[T]he division of executive and judicial power into two 
separate branches of government was a relative novelty in political 
 
 378. Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46 MERCER 
L. REV. 645, 645 (1995). 
 379. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 565, 571 (1996). 
 380. The claim advanced here is distinct from the assertion that judges have class-based 
interests. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 
1581 (1988) (arguing that “independent judges are quite capable of confusing the public good 
with narrow ideological or class-based concerns”). I am concerned here with institutional, not 
ideological, motives.  
 381. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasizing the judiciary’s lack of dependence).  
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theory.”382 Indeed, at least one element of the salient historical 
experience—the vigorous deployment of the habeas corpus writ by 
the King’s Bench in England at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century—suggested that it was feasible to have robust judicial 
oversight of liberty-infringing governmental powers without the 
formal accouterments of judicial independence.383 Notwithstanding 
this experience, Separation of Powers theory assumes that the 
requirement of judicial as well as executive and legislative 
involvement in state-sponsored liberty deprivations will serve as a 
brake on the overzealous use of coercive power.384 
But this is not necessarily so because of the self-defeating effects 
of institutionalizing judicial power. On the one hand, elected officials 
may have strong preferences for liberty that might be imposed on 
other, more recalcitrant state actors. Federal politicians, for example, 
sought to use federal courts to expand liberties in the teeth of state 
officials’ opposition.385 The presence of multiple centers of political 
power, therefore, introduces the possibility that political control over 
the judiciary might lead to more libertarian outcomes. On the other 
hand, if judges’ and rights holders’ preferences slip out of alignment, 
judges may fail to pursue libertarian ends, or may pursue them with 
suboptimal lethargy. Separation of Powers theory, while expressing 
concern about political-branch capture of the judiciary, supplies no 
mechanism through which the judiciary’s interests would become 
aligned with those of constitutional-rights holders.386 There is also no a 
priori reason to think that the preferences of those on the federal 
bench will accord with the maximal protection of individual rights. 
Certainly, the mere absence of overt and ongoing political control 
cannot easily be equated with a vigorous passion for liberty. The case 
 
 382. Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 214 (1991); see also GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1777–1787, at 159–61 (1998) (discussing revolutionary-era difficulties “fit[ting] the 
judiciary into the scheme of government”). 
 383. In the early 1600s, members of the King’s Bench exercised a vigorous oversight of 
monarchical authority that became a paradigmatic model for later advocates of the Great Writ. 
PAUL HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64–84 (2010).  
 384. For elegant modern restatements of this claim, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1017 (2006); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated 
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1536–38, 1537 n.102 (1991). 
 385. See KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 138, 150–75 (2004). 
 386. Note that the interests of different rights holders might conflict. See, e.g., Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (resolving potential conflict between 
reproductive rights and religious liberty). There are many other examples. These show how 
hard it is to create an institution that protect the rights of all simultaneously.  
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for tethering judicial independence to liberty becomes even more 
complicated when the Article II process of judicial selection is 
examined. For nothing in either the nomination-and-confirmation 
process or the institutional setting of a court leads inexorably to a 
rights-related mission.387 Moreover, it is hard to view the Court’s 
history dispassionately and see a consistent and uniform commitment 
to all constitutional rights. 
It gets worse: The historical and theoretical arguments developed 
here suggest that the more successful the courts are at building up 
their institutional autonomy, the more likely they may be to have 
distinct corporate interests that are at odds with the interests of 
constitutional-rights holders. That is, the very conditions that produce 
institutional stability for courts undermine the incentives necessary 
for judicial vigor in pursuit of individual liberty interests. Given this 
trade-off between institutional capacity and institutional incentives, it 
seems reasonable to hesitate before assuming that the courts will 
always and necessarily act in accord with stable libertarian 
preferences. 
My analysis of the connection between judicial independence in 
its contemporary institutional form and the titration of constitutional 
remedies suggests that in the contest between institutional interests 
and concern for individual liberties, the latter has lost out as a 
historical matter. From the institutional perspective of federal courts, 
the constant stream of complaints thrown up by defective state courts, 
deficient police departments, and errant bureaucracies are a “petty” 
nuisance.388 The fault-based gatekeeping rule installed in the 
constitutional tort, habeas, and exclusionary rule contexts 
dramatically cuts down on the quanta of resources courts must 
allocate to these nuances. At the same time, it still leaves courts free 
to deal with more prestigious and higher profile facial challenges to 
laws that seek injunctive or declaratory relief. 
Contemporary experience, in summary, suggests that when 
federal courts are allowed both the discretion and the instruments to 
follow through on their institutional preferences, the doctrinal results 
can be reduced enforcement of constitutional rights. It can also mean 
that many constitutional claimants never even obtain an opportunity 
 
 387. For an insightful analysis of the political forces that shape the judicial-appointment 
process, see David R. Stras, Book Review Essay, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1047–72 (2008). 
 388. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 358, at 980. 
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to be heard in court, but rather see their claims deflected via 
summary pretrial process. This will inevitably lead to cases in which 
individual rights claims are deprived of any day in federal court to 
vindicate a constitutional right either before or after the fact—all 
because of policy judgments taken by the federal courts. In this 
fashion, judicial independence in its institutional form can be at war 
with the vindication of individual rights. 
The result here is consonant with a rich vein of scholarship 
expressly skeptical of the Separation of Powers. For example, 
Professor Elizabeth Magill has powerfully argued that the ideas of 
balance and separation between branches cannot be cashed out 
meaningfully because “in the contested cases, there is no principled 
way to distinguish between the relevant power” and “no way to 
measure the distribution of power among the branches at any point in 
time and no method to predict the effect of an institutional 
arrangement.”389 Magill’s work trains on the conceptual integrity of 
the Separation of Powers and its consequences for the overall 
political system, rather than the specific effects of judicial 
independence. Complementing Magill’s account, Professors Daryl 
Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued that “the degree and kind 
of competition between the legislative and executive branches vary 
significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the 
House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political 
party.”390 
Supplementing that literature, this Article suggests that the 
effects of judicial independence—another mode of institutional 
separation of authorities—are far less constant or salutary than many 
have believed. Complementing work that excavates the limited ability 
of federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights in the face of 
political resistance,391 my excavation of the causal connection between 
judicial independence and constitutional remediation suggests that 
those who hope to realize the Bill of Rights’ aspirations would do well 
not to follow its drafters advice: independent courts are not the 
 
 389. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2001); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1155–57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of balance 
or separation provide no determinate answer to institutional design questions). 
 390. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 31, at 2314. 
 391. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (analyzing the limits of school desegregation litigation under the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
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“peculiar . . . guardians” of constitutional rights. Instead, judges may 
often be their most implacable foes precisely because of the 
judiciary’s institutional interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The central goal of this Article has been to describe the rise of a 
fault-based system for rationing both process and remedies for 
constitutional violations, and to hypothesize one cause of that 
ascendancy that the literature has ignored. Since the early 1980s, that 
regime has diffused from constitutional tort jurisprudence to both the 
exclusionary rule and the postconviction habeas contexts. Scholars 
have failed to observe or study this doctrinal diffusion, or the 
concomitant unification of remedies doctrine across the three most 
frequently invoked mechanics for ex post redress for constitutional 
rights. 
The rise of fault-based rationing, I have hypothesized, is not just 
a function of changing judicial ideology. It is also a consequence of an 
independent federal judiciary pursuing its interests and preferences 
by shaping doctrine. It thus flows, in some nontrivial measure, from 
our commitment to judicial independence at the institutional level. 
The resulting legal landscape raises many hard questions of how 
constitutional rights can, or should, be vindicated. At the very least, 
the analysis presented here should call into question any easy or 
quick reliance on the courts as the first and last best protectors of 
constitutional rights, at least so long as they are free to pursue their 
own institutional interests. 
 
